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#### Our interpretation is that affirmatives must be topical to win the ballot.

#### “Resolved” before colon denotes a formal resolution

**AWS ’13** [Army Writing Style; August 24th; Online resource dedicated to all major writing requirements in the Army; Army Writing Style, "Punctuation — The Colon and Semicolon," <https://armywritingstyle.com/punctuation-the-colon-and-semicolon/>; GR]

The colon introduces the following:

a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis.

b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.)

c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it?

d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment.

e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock

g.  A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:". Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

#### The “United States federal government” is the three branches

U.S. Legal ’16 [U.S. Legal; 2016; Organization offering legal assistance and attorney access; U.S. Legal, “United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition,” <https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/>; RP]

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

#### “Prohibitions” are laws forbidding actions

Garner ’19 [Bryan A; Editor in Chief of Black’s Law Dictionary; Westlaw, Black's Law Dictionary, Eleventh Edition, “Prohibitions”]

prohibition (15c) 1. A law or order that forbids a certain action; PROSCRIPTION (1).

#### “Anti-trust law” is controlled by the federal government

Sagers ’15 [Christopher L; 2015; the James A. Thomas Distinguished Professor of Law and Faculty Director of the Cleveland-Marshall Solo Practice Incubator; Handbook on the Scope of Antitrust, “Introduction,” Ch. 1, p. 9]

B. Sources of the Scope of Antitrust Law

The scope of federal antitrust law is governed by three separate authorities: (1) the U.S. Constitution, (2) the language of the antitrust statutes themselves, and (3) the language of other federal statutes and regulations.

#### Vote neg for predictability: allowing the affirmative to pick any grounds for the debate makes negative engagement impossible.

#### The impact is iteration---advocating actions outside the resolution overstretches negative research burdens, which destroys second-level understanding and turns the case

Grossberg 15 **-** Morris Davis Distinguished Professor University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (Lawrence, We All Want to Change the World THE PARADOX OF THE U.S. LEFT A POLEMIC, <http://www.lwbooks.co.uk/ebooks/we_all_want_to_change_the_world.pdf>)

I will, in the following description, focus on the situation in the human sciences (rather than the hard sciences), where the explosion of publication creates an ever-expanding circle in which there is always too much to read—too many positions, too many arguments, too much contradictory evidence—so that scholars have to rely on either the author's stature or theoretical and/or political agreement. It has become almost impossible to read everything one must read, everything necessary to legitimate, at least in traditional terms, the claim of academic expertise or scholarship. In fact, given this situation (and its consequences as I will describe below), the most surprising thing is how much good work continues to be produced. This situation has serious consequences: First, one's expertise becomes defined in increasingly narrow terms, resulting in the proliferation of sub-fields.9 **[insert footnote 9]** For example, one might point to security studies, surveillance studies, transition studies, game studies, code studies, hip-hop studies, horror studies, etc. **[Footnote 9 ends]** And while each of them is valuable for their interdisciplinary efforts around a new empirical field, they all too often act as if the questions (and the realities they interrogate) are new; unfortunately, they rarely say anything new or surprising, anything that has not been said elsewhere. They frequently simply re-discover in their own empirical "pocket" universe what others have said previously in other fields. For example, all sorts of technologically defined sub-fields rediscover the rather old assumption that media audiences are active. This is partly because, within each subfield, one gets the impression of witnessing endless redistributions of a highly circumscribed set of citations and authors, under a series of ever-changing terms to describe their fields or positions. So, academics create ever shrinking circles in which authors cite a few theoretically and politically compatible works, and then follow the footnotes, all of which ultimately lead back to the original authors, creating an endlessly self-referential closed system of citations, a numbingly predictable, circular tissue of references. Second, one is less likely to read work that appears tangential but may nevertheless be absolutely decisive to producing truly interesting and insightful research. Asking significant questions should demand that one makes reference to all sorts of concepts and questions which would lead one to follow other unexpected traditions and lines of research, since any investigation (e.g., around questions of participation, publics, or leadership, to use only a few examples that have irked me recently) is likely to open up to an entire history of problematization, of conversations and debates, but who can afford the time and energy anymore. Third, one tends to read only the most recent work since so much is being published—in various media—so rapidly that there is little time to go back and read. Fourth, one tends to select one's sources according to criteria that have more to do with theoretical and political sympathies than with an understanding of research as a conversation with difference. One reads selectively, finding those ideas that are already in line with what one assumes one already knows, and one establishes a body of near-sacred texts; fifth, one selects topics that are au courant, partly because there is less scaffolding that one has to build upon and partly because one's work is more likely to gain visibility and impact. Sixth, complexity goes out the door as one increasingly "sees the world in a grain of sand." One can no longer be satisfied claiming to have discovered merely a new piece of a complex puzzle or even an interesting redeployment of an older practice or structure, because such claims do not bring fame and glory—either to oneself or the university. Instead, one has to have discovered the leading edge, the new key or essence. One good but relatively small idea is expanded into a metonym for the entire economy, culture or society. Instead of seeking new discursive forms to embody complexity, uncertainty and humility, one goes with elegance, hyperbole and the ever receding new.

#### Debates over the specific details of the implementation of a plan breaks cycles of polarization---debates about value systems in the abstract reinforce it.

Wray Herbert 12 {Wray Herbert is the author of the book On Second Thought: Outsmarting Your Mind's Hard-Wired Habits. He is an award-winning journalist who has been writing about psychological science for more than 25 years. He’s citing Philip Fernbach, a psychological scientist at the University of Colorado. 9/26/2012. “Extremist Politics: Debating the Nuts and Bolts.” <https://www.huffpost.com/entry/extremist-politics-debating-the-nuts-and-bolts_b_1914307>}//JM

Starting next week and through October, President Barack Obama and Gov. Mitt Romney will face off in a series of four televised debates, designed to clarify the candidates’ positions on the most pressing public policy issues confronting the nation today. In place of the ideals and elegant rhetoric of the campaign trail, the leaders of the two major parties will have an opportunity to describe the nitty-gritty of governing: how they will deal with complex matters like affordable health care, foreign policy in the Middle East, job creation, equitable taxation, and more.

But the unfortunate reality is that Americans won’t get much in the way of detail and explanation. If history is any guide, the debate moderators will not press very hard for nuts and bolts, instead allowing the candidates to evade and attack and talk in unhelpful generalities. They will preach in pre-tested catch phrases to the already converted rather than really explaining the difficult day-to-day realities of decision making in a democracy.

Cynics will say that it doesn’t matter, that voters’ minds are made up anyway. But if national debates aren’t the venue for challenging citizens’ thinking, then what is? Voters need to understand the prosaic details of complex policies. Most have staked out positions on these issues, but they are not often reasoned positions, which take hard intellectual work. Most citizens opt instead for simplistic explanations, assuming wrongly that they comprehend the nuances of issues.

Psychological scientists have a name for this easy, automatic, simplistic thinking: the illusion of explanatory depth. We strongly believe that we understand complex matters, when in fact we are clueless, and these false and extreme beliefs shape our preferences, judgments, and actions — including our votes.

Is it possible to shake such deep-rooted convictions? That’s the question that Philip Fernbach, **a psychological scientist at the University of Colorado’s Leeds School of Business,** wanted to explore. Fernbach and his colleagues wondered if forcing people to explain complex policies in detail — not cheerleading for a position but really considering the mechanics of implementation — might force them to confront their ignorance and thus weaken their extremist stands on issues. They ran a series of lab experiments to test this idea.

They started by recruiting a group of volunteers in their 30s — Democrats, Republicans, and Independents — and asking them to state their positions on a variety of issues, from a national flat tax to a cap-and-trade system for carbon emissions. They indicated how strongly the felt about each issue and also rated their own understanding of the issues. Then the volunteers were instructed to write elaborate explanations of two issues. If the issue was cap and trade, for example, they would first explain precisely what cap and trade means, how it is implemented, whom it benefits and whom it could hurt, the sources of carbon emissions, and so forth. They were not asked for value judgments about the policy or about the environment or business, but only for a highly detailed description of the mechanics of the policy in action.

Let’s be honest: Most of us never do this. Fernbach’s idea was that such an exercise would force many to realize just how little they really know about cap and trade, and confronted with their own ignorance, they would dampen their own enthusiasm. They would be humbled and as a result take less extreme positions. And that’s just what happened. Trying — and failing — to explain complex policies undermined the extremists’ illusions about being well-informed. They became more moderate in their views as a result.

Being forced to articulate the nuts and bolts of a policy is not the same as trying to sell that policy. In fact, talking about one’s views can often strengthen them. Fernbach believes it’s the slow, cognitive work — the deliberate analysis — that changes people’s judgments, but he wanted to check this in another experiment. This one was very similar to the first, but some volunteers, instead of explaining a policy, merely listed reasons for liking it. Consider universal health care, for example: It’s highly complex and challenging to explain, but much easier to label it “compassionate” or, alternatively, “European” or “socialist.” So some volunteers were assigned to do the hard explaining and others the simplistic labeling.

The results were clear. As described in a forthcoming issue of the journal Psychological Science, those who simply listed reasons for their positions — articulating their values — were less shaken in their views. They continued to think they understood the policies in their complexity, and, notably, they remained extreme in their passion for their positions. In a final version of the study, volunteers who were forced to confront their inadequate knowledge actually gave less money to the cause, suggesting that with their extremism attenuated, they actually acted more moderately.

Americans in 2012 are about as polarized and partisan as they’ve ever been, and such polarization tends to reinforce itself. People are unaware of their own ignorance, and they seek out information that bolsters their views, often without knowing it. They also process new information in biased ways, and they hang out with people like themselves. All of these psychological forces increase political extremism, and no simple measure will change that. But forcing the candidates to provide concrete and elaborate plans might be a start; it gives citizens a starting place. As former presidential hopeful Ross Perot famously stated, “The devil is in the details.”

#### If they make debate unpredictable for one side, they also make it unfair---that must be a voting issue because integrity of the game is a precondition for voting, and we’ve all implicitly agreed fairness is good by abiding by other norms---not voting for fairness elevates judge biases which are worse, but if you don’t think fairness is an impact, automatically vote neg even if they’re winning the debate.

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#### Their theory of black relationality is rooted in negative identity, which ensures endless rejection that forecloses political change.

Brown 1995 (Wendy, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). pp. 69-71)

Enter politicized identity, now conceivable in part as both product of and reaction to this condition, where "reaction" acquires the meaning Nietzsche ascribed to it: namely, an effect of domination that reiterates impotence, a substitute for action, for power, for self-affirmation that reinscribes incapacity, powerlessness, and rejection. For Nietzsche, ressentiment itself is rooted in reaction – the substitution of reasons, norms, and ethics for deeds – and he suggests that not only moral systems but identities themselves take their bearings in this reaction. As Tracy Strong reads this element of Nietzsche's thought: Identity ... does not consist of an active component, but is reaction to something outside; action in itself, with its inevitable self-assertive qualities, must then become something evil, since it is identified with that against which one is reacting. The will to power of slave morality must constantly reassert that which gives definition to the slave: the pain he suffers by being in the world. Hence any attempt to escape that pain will merely result in the reaffirmation of painful structures. If the "cause" of ressentiment is suffering, its "creative deed" is the reworking of this pain into a negative form of action, the ''imaginary revenge" of what Nietzsche terms "natures denied the true reaction, that of deeds. " This revenge is achieved through the imposition of suffering "on whatever does not feel wrath and displeasure as he does" (accomplished especially through the production of guilt), through the establishment of suffering as the measure of social virtue, and through casting strength and good fortune ("privilege," as we say today) as self-recriminating, as its own indictment in a culture of suffering: "it is disgraceful to be fortunate, there is too much misery. " But in its attempt to displace its suffering, identity structured by ressentiment at the same time becomes invested in its own subjection.' This investment lies not only in its discovery of a site of blame for its hurt will, not only in its acquisition of recognition through its history of subjection (a recognition predicated on injury, now righteously revalued), but also in the satisfactions of revenge, which ceaselessly reenact even as they redistribute the injuries of marginalization and subordination in a liberal discursive order that alternately denies the very possibility of these things and blames those who experience them for their own condition. Identity politics structured by ressentiment reverse without subverting this blaming structure: they do not subject to critique the sovereign subject of accountability that liberal individualism presupposes, nor the economy of inclusion and exclusion that liberal universalism establishes. Thus, politicized identity that presents itself as a self-affirmation now appears as the opposite, as predicated on and requiring its sustained rejection by a "hostile external world." Insofar as what Nietzsche calls slave morality produces identity in reaction to power, insofar as identity rooted in this reaction achieves its moral superiority by reproaching power and action themselves as evil, identity structured by this ethos becomes deeply invested in its own impotence, even while it seeks to assuage the pain of its powerlessness through its vengeful moralizing, through its wide distribution of suffering, through its reproach of power as such. Politicized identity, premised on exclusion and fueled by the humiliation and suffering imposed by its historically structured impotence in the context of a discourse of sovereign individuals, is as likely to seek generalized political [failure] ~~paralysis~~, to feast on generalized political impotence, as it is to seek its own or collective liberation through empowerment. Indeed, it is more likely to punish and reproach - "punishment is what revenge calls itself; with a hypocritical he it creates a good conscience for itself" than to find venues of self-affirming action.

#### The affs framing of self-care as a prerequisite creates a focus on the self that endlessly defers collective organization- the alt solves better through community care

B. LOEWE 12, an organizer and communicator, has served as NDLON's Communications Director, supported the Alto Arizona work against SB 1070 and Sheriff Arpaio, and participated in the organizing of the 2010 US Social Forum in Detroit [“An End to Self Care,” *Organizing Upgrade*, October 15 12, http://www.organizingupgrade.com/index.php/blogs/b-loewe/item/729-end-to-self-care]

As long as self-care is discussed as an individual responsibility and additional task, it will be something that middle-class people with leisure time will most easily relate to and will include barriers to the lives of people without time to spare. It becomes one more unchecked box on a to-do list to feel bad about, an unreal expectation, or a far-off dream.

The movement is my self-care not my reason for needing it.

Don Andres awoke every morning at 5:00am to arrive at a street corner to look for work by 6:00am. He’d work a full day of heavy construction and still arrive at the 7:00pm meeting. He’d routinely fall asleep but he was there. Why? Because organizing together to improve conditions, to create alternatives, to band together, was the only option for how care could be anything but alien in his life as a day laborer. Being at the meeting was self-care.

Lack of care is systemic. Therefore resistance to those systems is the highest affirmation of care for oneself and one’s community. Movement work is healing work.

What self-care often misses is the reality that for the majority of people engaged in social justice movements, participation is out of necessity. That a collective effort in the form of social movement is the highest articulation of caring for one’s own self in a world designed to deny your worthiness of care. Too many people discussing self-care overlook the structural barriers that make access to the care they are speaking of impossible without the struggle they often discuss as the cause of their need to ‘take care of themselves.’

Even for someone like myself who has the majority of my materials needs met, I feel most alive, most on fire, most able to go around the clock, when I’m doing political work that feels authentic, feels like it pushes the bounds of authority, and feels like it is directly connected to advancing my individual and our collective liberation.

The truth is that we cannot knit our way to revolution. The issue is not that movements are taxing, because truly they are. It’s called ‘struggle’ for a reason. But they go from strain to overtaxing when we seek to fulfill our political aspirations through vehicles never meant to carry them like in non-political formations or some 501c3s.

The crisis of care is also a crisis of organization. Non-profits are built to do a lot of good, but they have inherent limitations that mean they are rarely built to fulfill our visions of the transformative organizing that would usher in a world where we could feel whole. Most engaged in social movements today are originally driven out of either a concrete material necessity and/or a deep connection to the wrong that accompanies inequality and a drive to make it right. However the majority of organizations available to us today are designed for gentle reforms but not the fundamental transformation our spirits crave. As a result, we try to transform a model unfit to nourish our hearts and then treat that frustration with tonics and diets and stretches instead of placing our efforts in creating a collective space that unleashes our heart’s creative desires.

Maria Poblet of Causa Justa Just Cause once said, “Burnout is not about the amount of hours you work, it is about the amount of political clarity you have.” What that means is that there is no chance of us consistently burning the midnight oil if we don’t at our core believe what we’re working on will get us to a new day and no amount of yoga or therapy or comfort food we supplement our work with will compensate for that. However, if we can see a better world just over the horizon, like a marathon runner nearing a finish line, we can find endless wells to draw upon as we work to usher it in. I have literally gone from being in debilitating pain and only being able to accomplish three hours of work each day to working 18 hour shifts the same week in a completely different context. The difference was not the conditions of my work. It was my connection to my purpose.

The problem with self-care is that there is an underlying assumption that our labor is draining. The deeper question is how do we shape our struggles so that they are life-giving instead of energy-taking processes. When did activities that are aimed to move us closer to freedom stop moving us?

#### Capitalism causes war, violence, environmental destruction and extinction

Robinson, PhD Sociology, 16 (William I, professor of sociology, global studies and Latin American studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara <http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/35596-sadistic-capitalism-six-urgent-matters-for-humanity-in-global-crisis>)

In these mean streets of globalized capitalism in crisis, it has become profitable to turn poverty and inequality into a tourist attraction. The South African Emoya Luxury Hotel and Spa company has made a glamorized spectacle of it. The resort recently advertised an opportunity for tourists to stay "in our unique Shanty Town ... and experience traditional township living within a safe private game reserve environment." A cluster of simulated shanties outside of Bloemfontein that the company has constructed "is ideal for team building, braais, bachelors [parties], theme parties and an experience of a lifetime," read the ad. The luxury accommodations, made to appear from the outside as shacks, featured paraffin lamps, candles, a battery-operated radio, an outside toilet, a drum and fireplace for cooking, as well as under-floor heating, air conditioning and wireless internet access. A well-dressed, young white couple is pictured embracing in a field with the corrugated tin shanties in the background. The only thing missing in this fantasy world of sanitized space and glamorized poverty was the people themselves living in poverty. Escalating inequalities fuel capitalism's chronic problem of over-accumulation. The "luxury shanty town" in South Africa is a fitting metaphor for global capitalism as a whole. Faced with a stagnant global economy, elites have managed to turn war, structural violence and inequality into opportunities for capital, pleasure and entertainment. It is hard not to conclude that unchecked capitalism has become what I term "sadistic capitalism," in which the suffering and deprivation generated by capitalism become a source of aesthetic pleasure, leisure and entertainment for others. I recently had the opportunity to travel through several countries in Latin America, the Middle East, North Africa, East Asia and throughout North America. I was on sabbatical to research what the global crisis looks like on the ground around the world. Everywhere I went, social polarization and political tensions have reached explosive dimensions. Where is the crisis headed, what are the possible outcomes and what does it tell us about global capitalism and resistance? This crisis is not like earlier structural crises of world capitalism, such as in the 1930s or 1970s. This one is fast becoming systemic. The crisis of humanity shares aspects of earlier structural crises of world capitalism, but there are six novel, interrelated dimensions to the current moment that I highlight here, in broad strokes, as the "big picture" context in which countries and peoples around the world are experiencing a descent into chaos and uncertainty. 1) The level of global social polarization and inequality is unprecedented in the face of out-of-control, over-accumulated capital. In January 2016, the development agency Oxfam published a follow-up to its report on global inequality that had been released the previous year. According to the new report, now just 62 billionaires -- down from 80 identified by the agency in its January 2015 report -- control as much wealth as one half of the world's population, and the top 1% owns more wealth than the other 99% combined. Beyond the transnational capitalist class and the upper echelons of the global power bloc, the richest 20 percent of humanity owns some 95 percent of the world's wealth, while the bottom 80 percent has to make do with just 5 percent. This 20-80 divide of global society into haves and the have-nots is the new global social apartheid. It is evident not just between rich and poor countries, but within each country, North and South, with the rise of new affluent high-consumption sectors alongside the downward mobility, "precariatization," destabilization and expulsion of majorities. Escalating inequalities fuel capitalism's chronic problem of over-accumulation: The transnational capitalist class cannot find productive outlets to unload the enormous amounts of surplus it has accumulated, leading to stagnation in the world economy. The signs of an impending depression are everywhere. The front page of the February 20 issue of The Economist read, "The World Economy: Out of Ammo?" Extreme levels of social polarization present a challenge to dominant groups. They strive to purchase the loyalty of that 20 percent, while at the same time dividing the 80 percent, co-opting some into a hegemonic bloc and repressing the rest. Alongside the spread of frightening new systems of social control and repression is heightened dissemination through the culture industries and corporate marketing strategies that depoliticize through consumerist fantasies and the manipulation of desire. As "Trumpism" in the United States so well illustrates, another strategy of co-optation is the manipulation of fear and insecurity among the downwardly mobile so that social anxiety is channeled toward scapegoated communities. This psychosocial mechanism of displacing mass anxieties is not new, but it appears to be increasing around the world in the face of the structural destabilization of capitalist globalization. Scapegoated communities are under siege, such as the Rohingya in Myanmar, the Muslim minority in India, the Kurds in Turkey, southern African immigrants in South Africa, and Syrian and Iraqi refugees and other immigrants in Europe. As with its 20th century predecessor, 21st century fascism hinges on such manipulation of social anxiety at a time of acute capitalist crisis. Extreme inequality requires extreme violence and repression that lend to projects of 21st century fascism. 2) The system is fast reaching the ecological limits to its reproduction. We have reached several tipping points in what environmental scientists refer to as nine crucial "planetary boundaries." We have already exceeded these boundaries in three areas -- climate change, the nitrogen cycle and diversity loss. There have been five previous mass extinctions in earth's history. While all these were due to natural causes, for the first time ever, human conduct is intersecting with and fundamentally altering the earth system. We have entered what Paul Crutzen, the Dutch environmental scientist and Nobel Prize winner, termed the Anthropocene -- a new age in which humans have transformed up to half of the world's surface. We are altering the composition of the atmosphere and acidifying the oceans at a rate that undermines the conditions for life. The ecological dimensions of global crisis cannot be understated. "We are deciding, without quite meaning to, which evolutionary pathways will remain open and which will forever be closed," observes Elizabeth Kolbert in her best seller, The Sixth Extinction. "No other creature has ever managed this ... The Sixth Extinction will continue to determine the course of life long after everything people have written and painted and built has been ground into dust." Capitalism cannot be held solely responsible. The human-nature contradiction has deep roots in civilization itself. The ancient Sumerian empires, for example, collapsed after the population over-salinated their crop soil. The Mayan city-state network collapsed about AD 900 due to deforestation. And the former Soviet Union wrecked havoc on the environment. However, given capital's implacable impulse to accumulate profit and its accelerated commodification of nature, it is difficult to imagine that the environmental catastrophe can be resolved within the capitalist system. "Green capitalism" appears as an oxymoron, as sadistic capitalism's attempt to turn the ecological crisis into a profit-making opportunity, along with the conversion of poverty into a tourist attraction. 3) The sheer magnitude of the means of violence is unprecedented, as is the concentrated control over the means of global communications and the production and circulation of knowledge, symbols and images. We have seen the spread of frightening new systems of social control and repression that have brought us into the panoptical surveillance society and the age of thought control. This real-life Orwellian world is in a sense more perturbing than that described by George Orwell in his iconic novel 1984. In that fictional world, people were compelled to give their obedience to the state ("Big Brother") in exchange for a quiet existence with guarantees of employment, housing and other social necessities. Now, however, the corporate and political powers that be force obedience even as the means of survival are denied to the vast majority. Global apartheid involves the creation of "green zones" that are cordoned off in each locale around the world where elites are insulated through new systems of spatial reorganization, social control and policing. "Green zone" refers to the nearly impenetrable area in central Baghdad that US occupation forces established in the wake of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The command center of the occupation and select Iraqi elite inside that green zone were protected from the violence and chaos that engulfed the country. Urban areas around the world are now green zoned through gentrification, gated communities, surveillance systems, and state and private violence. Inside the world's green zones, privileged strata avail themselves of privatized social services, consumption and entertainment. They can work and communicate through internet and satellite sealed off under the protection of armies of soldiers, police and private security forces. Green zoning takes on distinct forms in each locality. In Palestine, I witnessed such zoning in the form of Israeli military checkpoints, Jewish settler-only roads and the apartheid wall. In Mexico City, the most exclusive residential areas in the upscale Santa Fe District are accessible only by helicopter and private gated roads. In Johannesburg, a surreal drive through the exclusive Sandton City area reveals rows of mansions that appear as military compounds, with private armed towers and electrical and barbed-wire fences. In Cairo, I toured satellite cities ringing the impoverished center and inner suburbs where the country's elite could live out their aspirations and fantasies. They sport gated residential complexes with spotless green lawns, private leisure and shopping centers and English-language international schools under the protection of military checkpoints and private security police. In other cities, green zoning is subtler but no less effective. In Los Angeles, where I live, the freeway system now has an express lane reserved for those that can pay an exorbitant toll. On this lane, the privileged speed by, while the rest remain one lane over, stuck in the city's notorious bumper-to-bumper traffic -- or even worse, in notoriously underfunded and underdeveloped public transportation, where it may take half a day to get to and from work. There is no barrier separating this express lane from the others. However, a near-invisible closed surveillance system monitors every movement. If a vehicle without authorization shifts into the exclusive lane, it is instantly recorded by this surveillance system and a heavy fine is imposed on the driver, under threat of impoundment, while freeway police patrols are ubiquitous. Outside of the global green zones, warfare and police containment have become normalized and sanitized for those not directly at the receiving end of armed aggression. "Militainment" -- portraying and even glamorizing war and violence as entertaining spectacles through Hollywood films and television police shows, computer games and corporate "news" channels -- may be the epitome of sadistic capitalism. It desensitizes, bringing about complacency and indifference. In between the green zones and outright warfare are prison industrial complexes, immigrant and refugee repression and control systems, the criminalization of outcast communities and capitalist schooling. The omnipresent media and cultural apparatuses of the corporate economy, in particular, aim to colonize the mind -- to undermine the ability to think critically and outside the dominant worldview. A neofascist culture emerges through militarism, extreme masculinization, racism and racist mobilizations against scapegoats. 4) We are reaching limits to the extensive expansion of capitalism. Capitalism is like riding a bicycle: When you stop pedaling the bicycle, you fall over. If the capitalist system stops expanding outward, it enters crisis and faces collapse. In each earlier structural crisis, the system went through a new round of extensive expansion -- from waves of colonial conquest in earlier centuries, to the integration in the late 20th and early 21st centuries of the former socialist countries, China, India and other areas that had been marginally outside the system. There are no longer any new territories to integrate into world capitalism. Meanwhile, the privatization of education, health care, utilities, basic services and public land are turning those spaces in global society that were outside of capital's control into "spaces of capital." Even poverty has been turned into a commodity. What is there left to commodify? Where can the system now expand? With the limits to expansion comes a turn toward militarized accumulation -- making wars of endless destruction and reconstruction and expanding the militarization of social and political institutions so as to continue to generate new opportunities for accumulation in the face of stagnation. 5) There is the rise of a vast surplus population inhabiting a "planet of slums," alienated from the productive economy, thrown into the margins and subject to these sophisticated systems of social control and destruction. Global capitalism has no direct use for surplus humanity. But indirectly, it holds wages down everywhere and makes new systems of 21st century slavery possible. These systems include prison labor, the forced recruitment of miners at gunpoint by warlords contracted by global corporations to dig up valuable minerals in the Congo, sweatshops and exploited immigrant communities (including the rising tide of immigrant female caregivers for affluent populations). Furthermore, the global working class is experiencing accelerated "precariatization." The "new precariat" refers to the proletariat that faces capital under today's unstable and precarious labor relations -- informalization, casualization, part-time, temp, immigrant and contract labor. As communities are uprooted everywhere, there is a rising reserve army of immigrant labor. The global working class is becoming divided into citizen and immigrant workers. The latter are particularly attractive to transnational capital, as the lack of citizenship rights makes them particularly vulnerable, and therefore, exploitable. The challenge for dominant groups is how to contain the real and potential rebellion of surplus humanity, the immigrant workforce and the precariat. How can they contain the explosive contradictions of this system? The 21st century megacities become the battlegrounds between mass resistance movements and the new systems of mass repression. Some populations in these cities (and also in abandoned countryside) are at risk of genocide, such as those in Gaza, zones in Somalia and Congo, and swaths of Iraq and Syria. 6) There is a disjuncture between a globalizing economy and a nation-state-based system of political authority. Transnational state apparatuses are incipient and do not wield enough power and authority to organize and stabilize the system, much less to impose regulations on runaway transnational capital. In the wake of the 2008 financial collapse, for instance, the governments of the G-8 and G-20 were unable to impose transnational regulation on the global financial system, despite a series of emergency summits to discuss such regulation. Elites historically have attempted to resolve the problems of over-accumulation by state policies that can regulate the anarchy of the market. However, in recent decades, transnational capital has broken free from the constraints imposed by the nation-state. The more "enlightened" elite representatives of the transnational capitalist class are now clamoring for transnational mechanisms of regulation that would allow the global ruling class to reign in the anarchy of the system in the interests of saving global capitalism from itself and from radical challenges from below. At the same time, the division of the world into some 200 competing nation-states is not the most propitious of circumstances for the global working class. Victories in popular struggles from below in any one country or region can (and often do) become diverted and even undone by the structural power of transnational capital and the direct political and military domination that this structural power affords the dominant groups. In Greece, for instance, the leftist Syriza party came to power in 2015 on the heels of militant worker struggles and a mass uprising. But the party abandoned its radical program as a result of the enormous pressure exerted on it from the European Central Bank and private international creditors. The Systemic Critique of Global Capitalism A growing number of transnational elites themselves now recognize that any resolution to the global crisis must involve redistribution downward of income. However, in the viewpoint of those from below, a neo-Keynesian redistribution within the prevailing corporate power structure is not enough. What is required is a redistribution of power downward and transformation toward a system in which social need trumps private profit. A global rebellion against the transnational capitalist class has spread since the financial collapse of 2008. Wherever one looks, there is popular, grassroots and leftist struggle, and the rise of new cultures of resistance: the Arab Spring; the resurgence of leftist politics in Greece, Spain and elsewhere in Europe; the tenacious resistance of Mexican social movements following the Ayotzinapa massacre of 2014; the favela uprising in Brazil against the government's World Cup and Olympic expulsion policies; the student strikes in Chile; the remarkable surge in the Chinese workers' movement; the shack dwellers and other poor people's campaigns in South Africa; Occupy Wall Street, the immigrant rights movement, Black Lives Matter, fast food workers' struggle and the mobilization around the Bernie Sanders presidential campaign in the United States. This global revolt is spread unevenly and faces many challenges. A number of these struggles, moreover, have suffered setbacks, such as the Greek working-class movement and, tragically, the Arab Spring. What type of a transformation is viable, and how do we achieve it? How we interpret the global crisis is itself a matter of vital importance as politics polarize worldwide between a neofascist and a popular response. The systemic critique of global capitalism must strive to influence, from this vantage point, the discourse and practice of movements for a more just distribution of wealth and power. Our survival may depend on it.

#### The alternative is to build solidarity around a mass socialist movement.

Dudzic & Reed 15 (Mark - National Organizer and Chairman of the United States Labor Party & Adolph - professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, “THE CRISIS OF LABOUR AND THE LEFT IN THE UNITED STATES,” p. 364-367, *Socialist Register*)

This does not mean that those who embrace a transformative vision must abandon all hope. Rather, the priorities, activities and resources of those who would rebuild a real left must be informed by this strategic sensibility. Building or rebuilding an effective left presence will be quite likely a decades-long process. This means that we are not well served by clambering after the Next Big Thing. We must start by excising the impulse – quite understandable for a political movement devoid of any real agency – toward utopian dreaming and wishful thinking. The spark will not ignite the prairie fire. Nor will the Ark float on its own account no matter how carefully we construct it. Recognizing the left’s political irrelevance can be emancipating, as it reduces the sense of urgency to try to mobilize around every one of neoliberalism’s daily outrages. That should provide space for serious strategic discussion of how to begin to build a mass socialist movement based in the working class and the creation of new institutions capable of mobilizing cross-class solidarity, as Sam Gindin has articulated in a particularly clear and compelling way.25 Certainly, the US left could benefit from a nonsectarian, organized force with a coherent strategic vision and programme. The absence of a disciplined, unified and sophisticated group of cadre is a major source of the left’s incoherence, and helps explain why moments of spontaneous political upsurge have had, at best, an episodic impact and remain unconnected to similar moments in the past – even those in which the same activists have participated. Such organization, however, cannot be created in a vacuum. It can only emerge in tandem with a growing working-class movement. We fear that in the specific context of US history and practice, the socialist project is too narrow a platform from which to launch a broad and far ranging left revitalization. Socialist practice in the US has become the domain of sectarian groups that drive away working-class support, and socialist consciousness has not embedded itself in any significant sections of the working class or a left capable of exercising social power. That failing reflects the cultural and ideological triumph of neoliberalism and the identitarian ideologies and programmes that serve as its left wing. In this environment, building socialism is exclusively a project of cadre development, albeit one that cannot hope to succeed apart from broader movement-building. Broad movement-building requires mobilizing around an agenda of substantively anti-capitalist reforms that directly and militantly assert the priority of social needs over market forces, bourgeois property rights and managerial prerogative in the workplace and production process. Struggles to preserve and expand public institutions and to decommoditize basic human needs like housing, transportation, healthcare and education could begin to address the immediate challenge, which is to create a new popular constituency for a revitalized movement, instead of reorganizing or re-mobilizing an already existing but totally marginalized left.26 Some question whether the current US labour movement is too narrow a platform on which to rebuild a left. In a widely circulated article, ‘Fortress Unionism’, Rich Yeselson correctly highlights the atrophy of the labour movement and shows how its decline began with the passage of the TaftHartley Act in 1947. He contends that labour’s ‘current institutional expression cannot, via a creative conceptual breakthrough (“tactics or broader strategy”), engender a vast growth in union strength comparable to its former peak. In short, “organized labor” can no longer create a space for workers to join their organizations by the millions’.27 In grim statistical detail, Jake Rosenfeld’s What Unions No Longer Do gives fuel to this thesis. He points out that despite decades of exemplary, heroic and pioneering organizing by Justice for Janitors in the immigrant community, ‘Today only one in seven Hispanic janitors in the United States belongs to a union, down from one in five back in 1988, when Justice for Janitors began’.28 Yeselson calls for a ‘fortress unionism’ that would ‘defend the remaining high-density regions, sectors and companies’ and then ‘Wait for the workers to say they have had enough. When they demand in vast numbers collective solutions to their problems, seize upon that energy and institutionalize it.’29 This approach correctly identifies the urgent need to preserve the remnants of the current labour movement as an institutional base upon which to build a future revitalized movement. And it also correctly points out the haplessness of willy-nilly organizing schemes that do little to build power for working people while exposing their best leaders in unorganized workplaces to massive employer retaliation without any ability to defend them. But a strategy of waiting for workers to say they have had enough ultimately relies on magical thinking not unlike that of isolated Japanese soldiers scattered on island outposts at the end of the Second World War waiting for reinforcements from a defeated empire. Many of Yeselson’s critics, however, are equally quixotic. Bruce Raynor and Andy Stern, two of the most cynical practitioners of a unionism that disempowers workers and is based on a model of global class collaboration, point out that the ‘fortress’ strategy will do little to reduce inequality. Instead, they place their hopes in ‘strategic alliances with willing employers’; in unions developing value-added services to complement human resource departments; and in leveraging union and public-sector pension funds to rebuild union density.30 This strategy would liquidate the very concept of an independent labour movement. Given its decimation and marginalization, any revitalization movement would need to be built from a base that is far broader than the current institutional labour movement. A revitalized labour movement will have to embrace new organizational forms and some of the models emerging from new labour organizing show significant potential. Some are driven by necessity as the legal status of many immigrants and of workers in industries such as trucking, taxi driving and residential construction make organizing under current labour law virtually illegal. Much of this new organizing is being done by Worker Centers with heavy foundation funding and has the character of social work along the settlement house model of the early twentieth century. Much of it seems also, more or less openly, to fold class analysis into identitarian discourses that both substitute moralizing for political critique and fit comfortably within the NGO model. Such impulses, as well as the popularity of neologism, underlie arguments that current conditions have generated a new social formation, a ‘precariat’ that lies outside the traditional capitalist class structure.31 But some associated with this category have begun to evolve into substantial, self-conscious worker-run organizations. The Taxi Workers Alliance grew from a small New York City advocacy group to become a national organization (whose members are classified as ‘independent contractors’ and thus ineligible for union representation under US labour law) and was recently admitted to the AFL-CIO.32 In Vermont and elsewhere, strategic Workers Centers have built organic alliances with the labour movement and gone on to lead significant campaigns for healthcare for all, paid sick days and economic justice through the mobilization of a working-class constituency.33 Some argue that these campaigns and projects have the capacity to coalesce into geographically based class-conscious organizations and have called for the building of worker assemblies to give voice to this new movement.34 Such an effort would require a level of ideological sophistication and institutional independence that does not currently exist. Attempts to establish these structures on the ground have been premature and could actually inhibit the kind of broad, class-based organizing that inspires this movement in much the same way that many Labor Party chapters became captured by an ‘activistist’ mentality that focused more on preaching to the converted than building a constituency, while driving away real working-class voices who represented something more than themselves. New models are most successful when they can leverage existing organization and power to build outwards into new organization. Recent experiences organizing healthcare and homecare workers, hotel and casino workers and building services employees are fruitful examples of smart and strategic organizing that have leveraged existing union relationships and/ or political opportunities to build power for working people. We also look to the logistics organizing campaigns – which focus on the chokepoints of global capitalism and build on existing union power on the docks and other shipping centres – as having the potential to develop a particularly powerful form of a strategic union presence in economic sectors at the very core of contemporary capitalism.35

### 1NC---OFF

Atlantic K

#### Harney’s origin story that “The Atlantic slave trade was the birth of modern logistics” reinscribes the Eurocentric “tyranny of the Atlantic.”

Allen 14Richard B. Allen, Professor of History Framingham State University & Research Consultant and Editor Aapravasi Ghat Trust Fund (UNESCO World Heritage Site). Slaves, Convicts, Abolitionism and the Global Origins of the Post-Emancipation Indentured Labor System, Slavery & Abolition, 2014 Vol. 35, No. 2, 328–348, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0144039X.2013.870789 http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/Allen2014.pdf

The historiography of the free and forced labor trades that supplied European plantation colonies with millions of African, Indian, East Asian and other non-western workers between the seventeenth and early twentieth centuries is a case study in geographical, chronological and topical compartmentalization. Histories of European slave trading, the attendant African diaspora to the Americas and European abolitionism remain subject to what Edward Alpers aptly characterized more than 15 years ago as **the ‘tyranny of the Atlantic’ in slavery studies**.1 As their preoccupation with developments in Britain and the Caribbean attest, studies of the ‘great’ or ‘mighty experiment’ with the use of indentured labor following slave emancipation in the British Empire likewise tend to **focus on the Atlantic world** despite a long-standing awareness that the Indian Ocean island of Mauritius was the site of the **crucial test case** for the use of free agricultural laborers working under long-term written contracts and a wealth of demographic data which highlight the **Indian Ocean’s importance** in the history of a system that scattered more than 2.2 million workers throughout and beyond the colonial plantation world between the 1830s and 1920s.2 More indentured laborers landed in Mauritius than in any other colony while the total number of such workers who reached European colonies in the Indian Ocean basin surpassed those who arrived in the Caribbean by some 259,000.3 The Indian Ocean’s significance in this global labor migration becomes even more pronounced if the 1.5 million or more individuals who emigrated from southern India to plantations in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and Malaya to work under short-term, often verbal, contracts between the 1840s and the early twentieth century, and the 700,000–750,000 Indian migrants who labored on Assamese plantations between 1870 and 1900 are included in this labor diaspora.4

This historiographical tendency to privilege one oceanic world is matched by a propensity to draw a sharp dividing line between the pre- and post-emancipation eras despite widespread acceptance of the argument that the years after 1834 witnessed the creation and institutionalization of a ‘new system of slavery’ in the colonial plantation world.5 Histories of British colonies in the Caribbean and elsewhere usually end with the abolition of slavery in 1834 or occasionally with the termination of the ‘apprenticeship’ system in 1838, while studies of indentured laborers in these same colonies frequently pay little attention to the slave regimes that preceded them. Debates about conceptualizing and interpreting the indentured experience likewise reflect this tendency to view the colonial plantation world in terms of sharply demarcated pre- and post-1834 eras.6

The consequences of this chronological apartheid include an implicit, if not explicit, tendency to view the post-emancipation indentured labor system as a phenomenon separate and distinct unto itself, a notion which is reinforced by the historiographical emphasis on reconstructing the experience of indentured Indians to the exclusion of the hundreds of thousands of African, East Asian, Melanesian and other workers who also migrated throughout and beyond the colonial plantation world during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.7 This Indo-centrism is compounded in turn by a continuing penchant to focus on reconstructing limited aspects of indentured workers’ lives, doing so within tightly circumscribed social, economic, political and cultural contexts, and failing to compare local developments with those of indentured workers elsewhere in the colonial plantation world.8

These conceptual problems are similar to the pitfalls, especially **methodological** nationalism and **Euro-centrism**, identified by those working in the emerging field of global labor history as characteristic features of traditional theories about and interpretations of transnational labor migration.9 Recent research on labor migration in the Indian Ocean underscores the fact that a fuller understanding of the labor trades which supplied European colonies with millions of free and forced laborers is contingent upon **transcending this preoccupation with the particular**. Clare Anderson’s perceptive examination of the similar ways in which British officials thought about and processed Indian convicts and indentured laborers during the early nineteenth century, for example, demonstrates that these two labor trades can **no longer be viewed in isolation** from one another.10 Other work has established the increasing interconnectednessof the slave, convict and indentured labor trades in the Indian Ocean during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.11 In so doing, this research reveals that the post-emancipation indentured labor system originated some 25 years earlier than previously believed, that it took shape on a global stage that stretched from the Caribbean and the banks of the Thames to an obscure island in the South Atlantic and thence across the Indian Ocean to the Malay peninsula and finally to China, and that the British East India Company corporate-state played a **significant** and hitherto unappreciated role in this global migrant labor system’s early development.

#### Vote neg to endorse a global systems paradigm for militant preservation instead of an Atlantic-centric slavery paradigm.

Allen 14Richard B. Allen, Professor of History Framingham State University & Research Consultant and Editor Aapravasi Ghat Trust Fund (UNESCO World Heritage Site). Slaves, Convicts, Abolitionism and the Global Origins of the Post-Emancipation Indentured Labor System, Slavery & Abolition, 2014 Vol. 35, No. 2, 328–348, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0144039X.2013.870789 http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/Allen2014.pdf. Modified for ableist language.

In his excellent survey of indentured labor in the age of imperialism, David Northrup emphasized the need to view the movement of millions of indentured workers throughout and beyond the colonial plantation world not only in the context of its times, but **also as a global system** that invites comparison with the great European migrations of the day and age.93 Even a cursory survey of published scholarship since the appearance of Northrup’s book almost 20 years ago reveals, however, that indentured labor studies remain hobbled [undermined] by a **failure** to examine the indentured experience in well-developed local, regional, global and comparative contexts. This historiographical inertia may be traced to various factors: the continuing dominance of the Tinkerian ‘new system of **slavery’ paradigm** in both **scholarly and public discourse** about indentured labor; a corresponding propensity to view this system’s origins largely, if not exclusively, through the prism of an **Atlantic-centric** abolitionism in which the 1834 emancipation of slaves in the British Empire has acquired iconic status; and an Indo-centrism that distracts attention from or obscures work on other indentured populations. Northrup’s comments about the origins of the indentured labor trade echo these historiographical preoccupations:

Despite the existence of a few earlier experiments, it is fair to say that the new **indentured labor trade arose** in direct response to the abolition of slavery in the colonies of Great Britain in the 1830s and to its subsequent abolition or decline in French, Dutch, and Spanish colonies.94

Recent research on free and forced labor migration in the Indian Ocean reveals that the early experiments to which Northrup referred were, however, neither few in number nor marginally important to understanding the indentured labor system’s origins and subsequent development. This research highlights, moreover, that these experiments occurred in a truly **global setting** that stretched from the Caribbean to the South Atlantic and across the Indian Ocean to Southeast Asia and China. That this was so should come as no surprise given recent scholarship on the trans-imperial movement of ideas, personnel and news with the British Empire, especially during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.95 As P.J. Marshall has trenchantly observed, if there were significant differences between the British experience in the Atlantic and Indian Ocean worlds, there were also significant similarities between these two components of a single imperial entity.96 Compelling work on the impact that public knowledge about and perceptions of empire had on British politics and identity underscores this point.97 So do astute assessments of the limitations inherent in oceanic basin approaches to studying labor migration and maritime history.98 Insights provided by the emerging field of global labor history, including case studies such as Jan Lucassen’s examination of the VOC’s role in the emergence of an international labor market which connected Europe with southern Africa and South and Southeast Asia, further illustrate the need for indentured labor historians to transcend the conceptual parochialism that inhibits the development of a **much fuller understanding of this** post-emancipation **labor system in all of its complexity**.99 The challenge before us is, accordingly, to **probe much more deeply and perceptively** into the ways in which the complex dialog within and between these oceanic worlds shaped the nature and dynamics of a global migrant labor system, the legacy of which continues to resonate in our own day and age.

## ON

### 1NC---AT: Logistics

#### Their totalizing depictions of the pathology of logistics gets coopted by fascism—logistical planning is the solution to violent individuation.

Gironi and Negarestani, 18—IRC Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the School of Philosophy, University College Dublin AND Iranian philosopher (Fabio and Reza, “ENGINEERING THE WORLD, CRAFTING THE MIND,” <https://www.neroeditions.com/docs/reza-negarestani-engineering-the-world-crafting-the-mind/>, dml)

(2) The second objection might come from a communitarian perspective: surely we can build a world sealed off from the pathological systems that plague this planet. I counter this claim by saying that this supposed world is built on two presuppositions: (a) You are implicitly endorsing a metaphysical totality in which everything that is going on in this world of ours has been assimilated by a pathological system (e.g., Capitalism) but this totality is only an illusion which you have chosen to take for reality; (b) your commune in fact parasitizes on the affordances provided by our world. The alleged purity of your thoughts and actions is actually made possible by the pathologies from which you think you have diverged. Your commune is not a solution but only another anonymous contribution to the status quo.

(3) The third objection comes from the neoreactionary doctrine: the whole pursuit of universalism is misguided, for we are particular individuals so entrenched in the particularities of our experiences and ideologies that any recipe for universalism is nothing more than a fable for naive ideologues. My retort to this third objection is: ok, let us believe that universalism, hegemony-construction and consensus-building are just the logics of illusion. But surely your neoreactionary island requires a certain labor to integrate the like-minded individuals. In this process, you have assumed that doctrinal preferences trump over individual preferences, but you are sadly mistaken. For even in your neoreactionary island, you should deal with the problems of hegemony and consensus, albeit in a restricted scope. It is not that your idea of universalism is naïve—even though it really is but rather that you cannot even fathom the scope of particularities. Even in the case of people subscribing to the same agenda, we are always the creatures of our own particular experiences.

Now, an advocate of neoreaction might object that the institution of such islands does not require any form of unified ideology or consensus-building. Biorealism, or cybernetic circuitry of capitalism and untethered economic competition, can effectively consolidate those who have enlisted for neoractionary experimentations. But again, what is missing in such scenarios is a deeper understanding of the scope of human experiential particularities as dynamic perturbations of the system. Over time, even minor disturbances will have cumulative effects which, if not attended to in a context-sensitive manner, are guaranteed to throw the entire system into disarray. As for biorealist schemas, even if they were more than unscientific and dogmatic fantasies about nature—which they aren’t—that could consolidate and orient populations at an accelerated rate in the fashion depicted by Theodore Sturgeon in his story Microcosmic God: they will be still impinged upon by norms and personal desires of individuals. Not to mention, that the apt metaphor for natural selection is nature as a slow tinkerer rather than a great accelerator. What I would say to my neoreactionary friends is that to the extent that they do not take seriously the depths of incommensurable experiences, their island will eventually sink. For they think that in the Hobbesian game-theoretic jungle, all you need to do is to ward off enemies and make islands for those who believe in the same social experimentations. But as time passes, the Hobbes Inferno will exact its revenge upon you. Without an adequate understanding of particularities even when a common ideology or a so-called universal method of pruning is at stake, you will end up not just devouring your enemies but also eating your kin alive.

(4) The final objection comes from various fatalist doctrines, particularly, the doctrine of anti-praxis with its slogan “let it go.” First of all, I think anti-praxis attempts to present itself as a zero-claim ideology, one that has no claim, no practical norm, and no recipe for collective political action. In this sense, one can get the impression that perhaps anti-praxis is more genuine than the other tenets I listed above, in so far as it does not deceive you with lofty promises of salvation, emancipation or the great outdoors. It is what it is and stands in sharp contrast to the illusions of collective political action. However, such an impression is fundamentally credulous. There is no such a thing as a zero-claim doctrine. If we look at the early doctrine of fascism—particularly its Italian offshoot—we realize that this is precisely how fascism took root. It began with the claim that we indeed have no claim, no recipe because all recipes are oppressive.

This is not to equate anti-praxis with fascism but to simply point out that a zero-claim doctrine—one that sees all practical norms as oppressive—is rife for fascist appropriation. When the proponents of anti-praxis tell us that they have no political norm or recipe, we should look at them with utter suspicion. They are either trying in the worst case to dissimulate their ulterior motives under the rubric of ideological innocence or, in the best case, they are not conscious of their own implicit practical norms because they have already dispensed with the responsibility, authority, presuppositions, and implications involved in consuming and producing norms. Saying that we must abandon all practical norms is already a normative recipe to the extent that is predicated on the impermissibility—i.e. what we ought not do—of practical norms. In this sense, anti-praxis is just a false consciousness of its so-called lack of normativity or purported innocence.

Therefore, either anti-praxis is an implicit normative recipe or it is not. If it is, then it is not really anti-praxis, and it means that it is unaware of its own normative and/or practical assumptions. If it is not normatively practical, then it must be a theoretical position and as such it is predicated upon theoretical norms such as the knowledge of the current state of affairs, and thus beholden to epistemological norms of attaining the knowledge of the current situation. In other words, how do we know that the current state of affairs is thus-and-so? Either we have a procedure of determination that is in accordance with the public norms of doing theory, epistemology, etc, or it is the case that anti-praxis assumes we do not follow norms of theory (which are fundamentally entangled with norms of practical reasoning). In the latter case, anti-praxis is just another variation of the myth of the given and/or private access to reality. Or, maybe it is the case that anti-praxis is not even a theoretical position. In that case, it should be an aesthetic position. But if that is the case, it then has no purchase on the knowledge of the state of affairs on which it is built, nor does it have any saying as to what ought to be done and what ought not, even doing nothing. We should realize that doing nothing is itself a practical norm to the extent that we can only say “do nothing” insofar as we assume we ought not do such and such things. I would say anti-praxis is more like a new age monotheistic religion that prohibitively feeds off of practical norms of other religions, all to present itself as the last religion you should embrace.

So, in a nutshell, the first concrete recipe of universalism is the realization of our world: the real world is not a division between us and them, but a trap or enigma in which we are all ensnared. Aiming towards the construction a better world, entails seeking more computational resources. To see an enemy as an enemy is the first unwise strategy. The enemy is he or she who gives us a perspective otherwise unavailable to our intuitive or so-called immediate experience of the world. The abolishment of our pathological particular traits can only start when we diagnose what these particularities are and strive to change them by global or universal conditions.

Fabio Gironi: Let us move deeper into a more explicit political register. Some of your comments above regarding universalism and its detractors remind me of the “first law” of what the late Mark Fisher infamously called the “Vampire Castle,” i.e. the priestly, resentment-ridden left-wing intelligentsia. As he put it: “the first law of the Vampires’ Castle is: individualise and privatise everything. While in theory it claims to be in favour of structural critique, in practice it never focuses on anything except individual behaviour”. Similarly, your polemic against communitarianism and particularism, and against an understanding of the “local” as terminal horizon rather than as synthetic step for the piecemeal construction of a global framework seems in broad agreement with those political-economic stances that in recent years have been assimilated under the banner of accelerationism (as most concretely expounded in Srnicek’s and Williams’ Inventing the Future). I know that you were a friend of Fisher, and that you know Srnicek and Williams well, but can you offer me a clear description of your political stance, in relation to this broad orthodoxy-breaking and future-oriented trend in leftist thinking? Do you have any prescriptive stance regarding political action?

Reza Negarestani: I’m afraid that my political stance—or rather my philosophical view concerning what ought to be done in the arena of politics—oscillates between deep pessimism regarding our methods and optimism about future possibilities. Yet, insofar as any possibility can only be actualized by adequate and malleable methods and tools, and to the extent that our methods, ways of systematization, intervention with socio-economic reality and so on are either quite rudimentary or disoriented with regard to the realization of consequential political changes, I think I am more comfortable to identify myself as a rational pessimist. I reject passive pessimism in the sense that as long as possibilities can be imagined, we have to actively gamble and push beyond any vestige of resignation. Without imagining possibilities and piecewise attempts at actualizing them, there is in fact no good justification for surviving as a species. As Seneca has pointed out, in complete absence of such a struggle, we must perhaps devise the most cunning and artful contrivance for bringing our death about. In that case, even the slogan “let it go,” once inflated, is nothing but a disingenuous pessimism that attempts to fabricate a semblance of profundity. In reality, it is the very exemplification of human conservatism and an adolescent disgruntlement which secretly hopes for a miraculous change even when it tries to seem detached from such concerns. After all, romantic fatalism is the shallowest form of passive optimism, rather than genuine pessimism.

Other than the question of methods and tools, another reason for my doubt is what I mentioned in my answer to your previous question and which you brought up through Mark. It is the enigma of the particular. It is enigmatic precisely because the particular as a real condition can shapeshift and come in different guises, play different even contradictory roles in the domains of both the individual and the collective, the local and the universal piecewise integration and mobilization of localities. Mark was one of the best critics of the Hobbesian myth of the state as that which guards the human from their complete transformation into wolves, as that without which humanity is inconceivable. In a sense, Mark was far more radical than Hobbes in that he fathomed the depth of the enigma of the particular. The particular can be pernicious or even illusory through and through. The absolutization of the particular, the individuals—whether in the name of the victim, the sufferer or in the name of individual choices and preferences—completely misses the fact that the conditions of individuation can themselves be pathological. The overemphasis on the particular or the local, accordingly, can very well the blind perpetuation of the conditions of exploitation and misery. But particulars can also be positively non-trivial and implicitly collective perspectives: by making these perspectives explicit, we can shed light onto the problems of the individual and the collective. However, one thing is certain—as Mark would have agreed—the depth of particularities is inexhaustible. So much that, as I argued earlier, even those who dismiss the universalist labour have to deal with its drastic implication within their neo-reactionary floating islands. Absent a diagnosis of different kind of particularities, and short of analysing them with regard to the mechanisms responsible for generating and distinguishing such causal factors or mechanisms at different levels of socio-economic reality, we are all—and I mean everyone—on the same Hobbesian Raft of the Medusa. We will eventually betray ourselves and eat one another, irrespective of whether we think we should strive for a future universalist collective project, we should denounce such endeavours, or we should do nothing and just let it go.

Given the endless series of particularities, of individuals, and of localities, as well as their protean nature, I think that—given our current tools, modes of thinking and action, methods, etc.—we have at this point a very slim, if any at all, chance to do anything that leads us beyond the nightmare of this auto-cannibalistic raft. While I wholeheartedly support the paradigms raised by people like Patricia Reed, Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams which are focused on consensus-building, hegemony-construction and the critical integration of particularities of the human condition, I think as a philosopher I should take side with the Socratic method of the courage of truth with regard to the political action. And as such, I believe the prospects are now very dim, shockingly so. This claim should not incite the cheer of the right-inclined, resignatory, neo-reactionary, and conservative thinkers. If anything, it should lead them to confront the prospects of their own reality as well in terms of a pure terror, insofar as this dim prospect is not exclusive to the emancipatory politics to which we have subscribed but also includes their recipes or the lack thereof.

This brings me to the main question you raised regarding my political stance. I think this question is predicated on the assumption that we can define our political position by rummaging through and resorting to the concretely instantiated political paradigms which have already been realized and then choose one that fits our methodological and ideal ambitions. I really fail to see such an exemplification that I can hold to or define as my political position. One should engage a great feat of self-deception to see contemporary political paradigms as adequate to respond the existing tribulations and problems. Sure, I am a leftist who believes in the reality of the class struggle, but this is not really a political position, only a consciousness of the socio-economic reality. I take seriously Marx and Engels’s thesis that communism “is not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality (will) have to adjust itself. Communism is the real movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the premises now in existence.” This is what I would call—again following Mark—the possibility of actualizing that which is possible but from our perspective, here and now, seem impossible. For me the task of politics in conjunction with the support of philosophy and technoscience is to not only show—in theory and in collective imagination—that the reality of our world is neither inevitable nor a completed totality, but also manages to concretely build a new world from whose perspective our reality will be exposed as the illusion of the inexorable and finality. But then again, even this, is not a clear-cut political position. It is merely a philosophical thesis on the possibility of a different world and the range of political actions that can fully actualize it.

Fabio Gironi: You merge this rational pessimism with the “engineering approach” for the construction of a better world, as you explained before. To some, this paradigm of political action will sound like you are vouching for a dispassionate and formalist approach to politics, and a government of experts—a “technocracy,” something that in recent times has become anathema in most public discussion (but that, the critic might enjoy pointing out, has been proven to be a failure at least since Plato’s political misadventure in Syracuse)—or even for a nefarious kind of “social engineering.” I suspect that in large part this depends precisely on am equivocation about the very concept of “engineering.” In our folk understanding “engineers,” broadly conceived, are often considered too naive to deal with the intricacies of politics, a domain fraught with normative considerations.

But if I am not mistaken, your expert engineer is as much a technically-minded problem-solver as it is a creative conceptual builder: a figure that applies his or her intelligence to the resolution of problems by means of more than the unilateral application of simple formulas or pre-packaged precepts. Indeed, it seems to me that this is where many contemporary ideas converge. Srnicek’s and Willams’ proposal to “move beyond folk politics and create a new hegemony” and their insistence on the practical/political concept of “repurposing.” Ben Singleton’s reflection on cunning reason (metis) as employed for the strategic and piecemeal construction of freedom from constraints. And of course, your own “speculative inquiry into the future of intelligence,” or functional reconceptualization of intelligence as an emancipatory tool of self- and collective improvement—as well as for practical action upon the world—where conception and transformation are two sides of the same coin. Is it then correct to say the concept of “engineering” (rather different from its “folk” equivalent) is at the core of both your philosophical and political thinking?

Reza Negarestani: Among computer scientists, there is this joke: when computer scientists go into a room full of political theorists, philosophers, cultural critics and linguists, they say to each other, “get rid of all of them and replace them with engineers.” Well, perhaps this joke is a bit too much but it has a grain of truth. Neither philosophers nor political theorists are able to design proper methods adequate to actualize possibilities, imagined or not. We need politically and philosophically informed engineers and designers. Engineers are indeed not mindless technicians, they are people who have one foot in the domain of thinking and one in the realm of an external reality or worldly affairs. They do not see action as a form of hubristic mastery to the extent that they know whatever we do at any level of reality—be it natural, social or cultural—will meet the resistance of that reality. To use a Sellarsian metaphor, reality in the broadest possible sense is not a block of wax ready to be imprinted. Engineers truly know that. They also never see reality in any sense as a flat universe, they see it as vast and deeply multi-scaled structure. In order to concretely intervene at any level of reality we must not only have a multi-level view of the reality but also know which methods, models or tools should be implemented, and at which level. To cut at the joints without splintering the bones is a description of what engineers—as Plato’s good butchers—do.

There are at least two other important tasks which are deeply entangled with the discipline and philosophy of engineering. One is the labour of modelling and the other, the design of approximation techniques. Michael Weisberg has recently written a wonderful book on models and modelling, a topic which in the past was not being taken seriously but was central to engineering. Weisberg elaborates why all our encounters with reality involve one or another kind of model, for example, descriptive, explanatory and predictive models. Even what we call empirical data are not ready-made, they are products of model projection, which means data can be distorted or even false data may be derived if the model is inadequate, too small or too big, misapplied to a target system or applied to a wrong sector of reality. The thing about models is that they are packed with all sorts of implicit and explicit theoretical, mathematical, logical and computational assumptions. Such assumptions encompass not just the model’s description but also the core of the model i.e. the structure and its interpretive factors or construals which include information about the scope, assignment, and fidelity criteria of the model itself. The latter criteria pertain to the exact information which specify the model’s representational, dynamic and resolution constraints for a given level or scale. Without proper attention to such details and the assumptions underlying them, all data and facts can be fundamentally distorted or erroneous. The whole myth of raw or pure data is perpetuated by people who have no clue about how data is mined—irrespective of what kind of data we are talking about.

The other task, the design of approximation techniques, is even trickier. Mark Wilson sums up the nature of the approximation techniques in his new book, Physics Avoidance. Engineers—like Ben Singleton’s designers as embodiments of metis or cunning intelligence—are adept at trickery, hacking the system and reality. They know that it is not the best solution to modify a given target system by intervening with lower levels or fine-grained scales (like for example, the atomic scale-length of a metal beam). Intervention at such bottom levels is rife for what Wilson calls computational hazards, due to extreme fine-grained details of lower levels, any attempt at modification and intervention will either fail or become sub-optimal. Not to mention that we often lack any solid grasp of lower level mechanisms, sometimes we don’t even have any indication as what these fine-grained scales are, we can only postulate them. So what engineers do is first they model scales or levels pertaining to the structure of the target system or the phenomenon in question. Such modelling always involves a controlled amount of simplification and/or idealization which can at a later time be revised or equipped with more details. Then, they think of how to carefully bridge lower levels to upper levels where the structure is less fine-grained and more accessible and more hospitable to intervention and modification. These bridges—which are essentially mixed-level in that they contain information regarding middle scales between the bottom and the top—are called approximation techniques. These are procedures by which engineers circumvent the messy problems of physics without forgetting about them. Such techniques allow engineers to modify a given system optimally without always the need to deal with all sorts of details which make intervention fundamentally impractical from an applied perspective, from the computational cost standpoint, etc.

Here, however, a problem arises that André Carus, in his critique of Wilson’s work, has elaborated with the utmost lucidity. What is this problem? It is the idea that engineering conceived this way would be anti-Enlightenment in the sense that all we can ever do is to reform our local concepts and descriptive pragmatic resources in a piecemeal manner, without hoping to achieve unification. We can no longer have ambitious concepts that can be applied across the board—those global concepts treasured by philosophers such as the Copernican imperative, reason, freedom, etc. Our situation is similar to that of a child who plays in the tub and is in command of a rubber duck. But, of course, the picture of reality is more like that a river where torrential flows, undertows, and chaotic behaviours take hold of the rubber duck. In order to make sure this rubber duck sails in the river, we can no longer adopt a global concept of sail or navigation. We should have atlases of local theory façades which are responsive to such turbulent quandaries. And of course, to conform to such a picture of reality, we can only develop local concepts and heuristic norms which are informational packages that reflect varying and non-unifiable perspectives such as the concept of hardness—as for example applied to a metal beam—which fundamentally varies across different scale-lengths of the metal structure.

While I have a sympathy for such view, I believe Carus is right. Our encounters with reality are not merely such heuristic or pragmatic devices. Engineers always have a main solution—a global concept—in mind. Then they try to bring various real-time scenarios under it such that neither the global concept nor local pragmatic concepts are mutually exclusive but are rather mutually positively constraining and self-reinforcing. Engineering, in this sense, is about the commensuration of the local and the global, the ideal and the messy, the strategic and the tactical. Engineering, therefore, incorporates two senses of the Enlightenment’s rational reconstruction of the world or—to use Carnap’s later term—explication. One in the sense of realism and one in the sense of idealism, naturalism and constructivism. To reengineer and recognize reality, one can neither adopt a universal concept or paradigm nor just local and perspectival concepts. Both the overarching paradigm and local malleable solution are needed.

Now, as you asked, how do we adapt this engineering paradigm to politics? My friend Ray (Brassier) cautioned me regarding this unconditional espousal of engineering as a political method. I fully agree with him. Politics fundamentally differs from engineering from the perspective of norms of political action. The philosophically and politically informed engineering as a political method is predicated on the hard labour of politics which, to a great degree, consists of diagnosing our current situation and then deciding how should we move forward, the work necessary for arriving the global concept. However, I do disagree with the idea that unlike the realm of politics where “what ought to be done” is a matter of antagonism and consensus-building, engineering is centred on a pre-established conventional norm (i.e., this is what the system should do, or this is the agreed upon norm by which the system should behave). Even in engineering, we know that the system can have multiple diverging trajectories of evolution. There is no pre-established norm or consensus as what the system is and how it should behave. For engineers, there is no pre-established function of a given system since such functions do change over time and in accordance with local contexts. Modelling a system is as daunting a task for engineers as it is for political theorists and activists to diagnose pathologies of society, and to find a way to eliminate them. Reality is not a given totality: sometimes you should approach it as a black box that can only be unveiled by systematically playing or intervening with it. Other times, you should do the hard work of modelling under epistemological constraints. All in all, the task is to integrate global concepts with contrasting local concepts.

So yes, in response to your question I take the paradigm of engineering as a profoundly composite—epistemological and practical—way of thinking about the world. And this also leads me to finally answer the question you posed earlier regarding what can be the concrete way of getting political ambitions done. Our first step in a concrete political project should be focused on diagnosing the precise causal mechanism responsible for the pathologies of individuation, to detect the levels at which such mechanism are entrenched, and then proceed to develop tools to intervene at those exact levels—like an engineer. If you don’t have the adequate tools to intervene at that level, then devise approximation techniques, resolve the problem at a different level. And, again like an engineer, attempt to lay out the logic(s) of existing worlds at different scales. Make new tools to construct new worlds from the detritus of the old one. The new different world is not a miracle or a religious afterlife, it is a world engineered from what is available to us. To recapitulate, we need to first understand the plural logics of this world almost like the multi-level ontologies of information science to even think what ought to be done and decide exactly what methods or tools at what level should be exercised.

#### They fail without the state.

Tarlau ’17 (Rebecca; 5/23/17; Ph.D. in Social and Cultural Studies in Education from UC Berkeley, B.A. in Anthropology and Latin American Studies from the University of Michigan, Postdoctoral Scholar in Education at Stanford University; Berkeley Journal, “An International Perspective on Jonathan Smucker’s Hegemony How-To: A Roadmap for Radicals,” <http://berkeleyjournal.org/2017/05/an-international-perspective-on-jonathan-smuckers-hegemony-how-to-a-roadmap-for-radicals/>; RP)

The book starts off with Smucker’s reflections on his own political trajectory, and his realization that most of the political groups that he has participated in have a communication strategy that speaks to “itself” (i.e., already-allied groups), with no strategy for growth. He discusses Occupy Wall Street as an **incredibly powerful** potential force, in that it created a new “floating signifier,” the idea of the “99 percent,” which was “amorphous enough for many different kinds of people to connect with and to see their values and hopes within the symbol” (p. 57). Thus, Occupy Wall Street had the **potential** to build a **broad-based political alignment**, but Smucker claims that it failed because a powerful current within Occupy Wall Street was **allergic to power** and refused to seize the opportunity to align with the many organizations that arrived at their doorstep. In response to what Smucker sees as the Left’s **self-defeating tendency** to disavow power and **isolate**, he offers a series of recommendations. The first recommendation is an unequivocal defense of “strategic” over “prefigurative” politics. In Smucker’s definition of prefigurative politics, he writes that “prefigurative politics seeks to demonstrate the better world it envisions for the future in the actions it takes today. Connected to contemporary anarchist movements, prefigurative politics represented a major tendency within Occupy Wall Street” (p. 266). Smucker critiques the promoters of prefigurative politics, who viewed democratic decision-making processes and the physical occupation of space as manifestations of a better future, rather than **tactics in a broader political strategy** (p. 112). Smucker is not against prefiguration, or “manifesting our vision and values in our internal organizing,” but he argues that these types of actions and organizational forms cannot substitute for a strategy that **engages political power** (not just electorally, but in other institutional realms). Provocatively, Smucker argues that the prioritization of prefigurative over strategic politics was the **downfall of Occupy Wall Street**. A second major intervention is the idea of the “political identity paradox,” which Smucker summarizes as follows: “while political groups require a strong internal identity to foster the commitment needed for **effective** political **struggle**, this same cohesion tends to **isolate the group”** (p. 96). Instead of creating a movement sub-culture based on strong but exclusive political identities, Smucker argues that the goal is in fact to **become hegemonic**, or to make our movements’ moral and intellectual vision of the world dominant. Rather than righteously condemning “common sense,” the popular and contradictory ideas people hold about the world, he argues that we must **engage and transform it**. It is important to build each other up rather than prove that you are the smartest person in the room. Smucker describes Slavoj Žižek’s apt warning to Occupy organizers: “Don’t fall in love with yourself” (p. 116). Finally, a third major intervention is Smucker’s assertion that the goal of **every political organizer**, or member of a social movement core, ought to be to grow the movement’s base by **winning over new allies**, continually plugging new people into movement tasks, and articulating a broad-based and diverse vision. This takes skilled leadership, which is why Smucker argues we need “leaderful movements” not leaderless ones. How do we do this? Smucker’s answer is a **pedagogically appropriate communication** strategy, which engages people’s interest by tapping into their common narratives and building points of connection between those narratives and **concrete, winnable political campaigns**. Smucker refers to this as “**strategically branding”** our movements, although he acknowledges that this term may grate against the ears of anti-corporate organizers. The other strategy to build the base of our movements is “to name a common enemy and simultaneously frame a different kind of solidarity as a **basis for political mobilization”** (p. 239). In other words, the left must articulate the type of “we” that can unite diverse groups, like the “99 percent” did during Occupy Wall Street. Smucker acknowledges the difficulty of doing this, given the class- and race-based fissures in U.S. society, but he argues that connecting disparate groups and individuals “with fractured loyalties,” is the key to “constructing a broad-based challenger alignment” (p. 247).

#### Infiltration is best for militant preservation.

Williams 70 [Robert F., civil rights leader, promoter of self defense, interviewed by The Black Scholar, “Interviews,” The Black Scholar Volume 1 Number 7]

Williams: It is erroneous to think that one can isolate oneself completely from institutions of a social and political system that exercises power over the environment in which he resides. Self-imposed and premature isolation, initiated by the oppressed against the organs of a tyrannical establishment, militates against revolutionary movements dedicated to radical change. It is a grave error for militant and just minded youth to reject struggle-serving opportunities to join the man's government services, police forces, peace corps and vital organs of the power structure. Militants should become acquainted with the methods of the oppressor. Meaningful change can be more thoroughly effectuated by militant pressure from within as well as without. We can obtain valuable know-how from the oppressor. Struggle is not all violence. Effective struggle requires tactics, plans, analysis and a highly sophisticated application of mental aptness. The forces of oppression and tyranny have perfected a highly articulate system of infiltration for undermining and frustrating the efforts of the oppressed in trying to upset the unjust status quo. To a great extent, the power structure keeps itself informed as to the revolutionary activity of freedom fighters. With the threat of extermination looming menacingly before black Americans, it is pressingly imperative that our people enter the vital organs of the establishment. Infiltrate the man's institutions.

### 1NC---AT: Psychological Drives

#### Psychological explanations of racism are wrong

Hook 18 [Derek, Department of Psychology, Duquesne University, “Racism and jouissance: Evaluating the “racism as (the theft of) enjoyment” hypothesis,” Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society, September 2018, Volume 23, Issue 3, pp 244–266]

While this seems, in many ways, a gripping account, the degree of reductionism here from a sociologist or historian’s perspective must appear staggering. The multiple complex sociological, economic, and socio-historical variables underlying distinctive historical forms of racism are brushed aside in favour of a generalizing psychoanalytic formula.1 Racism = reaction to perception that the (perversely enjoying) other has stolen our enjoyment. This reduction of racism to an affective equation is evident also in Žižek’s precursor in this conceptual domain, Jacques-Alain Miller: Why does the Other remain Other? What is the cause for our hatred of him, for our hatred of him in his very being? It is hatred of the enjoyment in the Other. This would be the most general formula for the modern racism we are witnessing today: a hatred of a particular way the Other enjoys […] The question of tolerance or intolerance is […] located on the level of tolerance or intolerance toward the enjoyment of the Other, the Other who essentially steals my own enjoyment (Miller, cited in Žižek, 1993, p. 203). Not only does the above formula generalize across different socio-historical sites of racism, but it also bundles together a variety of different forms of prejudice. Anti-Semitism, racism, (hetero)sexism, xenophobia, etc. come very close to being reduced to problems of (libidinal/political) jealousy. The depoliticization (indeed, the implicit psychologization) inherent in such a conceptual move is surprising inasmuch it is something that Žižek has proved critical of elsewhere.2 In his contribution to Christopher Lane’s The Psychoanalysis of Race (1998), for example, Žižek outlines the charge of psychological reductionism against standard psychoanalytic explanations of racism, which offer “a way of explaining racism that ignores […] not only racism’s socioeconomic conditions but the sociosymbolic context of cultural values and identifications that generate reactions to the experience of ethnic otherness. (p. 154)” This is well said, but surely it applies also to the racism as theft of enjoyment formula outlined above? Explanations of racism as jouissance are surely prone to psychological reductionism inasmuch as they often appear to privilege a series of psychoanalytic assumptions (drive, fantasy, libido, projection, etc.) as existing prior to—or independently of—considerations of economic, historical, political, and socio-symbolic context. Does this explanatory over-reliance on the psychological not amount to a retreat from the political, to precisely an attempt to explain social phenomena on the basis of psychological accounts? Moreover, one often has the impression, in looking at passages such as those cited above, of a given conceptual template (indeed, a formula) imposed on one after another historical context by way of an “explanation” of racism, despite the huge variation in socio-historical and cultural factors. This one-size-fits-all type of explanation seems particularly ill-suited to Lacanian psychoanalysis which claims, after all, to be a science of the particular (Verhaege, 2002).

### 1NC---AT: Undercommons

#### The undercommons fails to resolve any of their impacts

Webb 18—Senior Lecturer in Education at the University of Sheffield (Darren, “Bolt-holes and breathing spaces in the system: On forms of academic resistance (or, can the university be a site of utopian possibility?),” Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies, 40:2, 96-118, dml)

It is easy to be seduced by the language of the undercommons. Embodying and enacting it, however, is difficult indeed. Being within and against the university, refusing the call to order through insolent obstructive unprofessionalism, is almost impossible to sustain. Halberstam (2009, 45) describes the undercommons as “a marooned community of outcast thinkers who refuse, resist, and renege on the demands of rigor, excellence, and productivity.” A romantic and appealing notion for sure but refusing and reneging on “the university of excellence” will cost you your job. When Moten describes subversion as a “series of immanent upheavals” expressed through “vast repertoires of high-frequency complaints, imperceptible frowns, withering turns, silent sidesteps, and ever-vigilant attempts not to see and hear” (2008, 1743), one is reminded instantly of Thomas Docherty, disciplined and suspended for his negative vibes.7 Being with and for the maroon community is difficult too. First of all, “Where and how can we find/see the Undercommons at work?” (Ĉiĉigoj, Apostolou-Hölscher, and Rusham 2015, 265). Where and how can one find those liminal spaces of sabotage and subversion, and how does one occupy them in a spirit of hapticality, study, and militant arrhythmia that brings the utopic underground to the surface of the fierce and urgent now? Beautiful language, but how does one live it? Networks do, of course, exist—the Undercommoning Collective, the Edu-Factory Collective, the International Network for Alternative Academia, to name but a few. These are promising spaces for bringing together and harboring the maroons and the fugitives. But networks are typically short-lived, and—as Harney and Moten warned—there is a danger of institutionalization, of taking institutional practices with you into alternative spaces “because we’ve been inside so much” (Harney and Moten 2013, 148). And so, predictably, meetings of the fugitives come with structure, order, an official agenda, and circulated minutes. The outcasts convene in conventional academic conferences, with parallel sessions, panels of papers, lunch breaks, wine and nibbles (e.g., Edu-Factory 2012). These spaces offer time out, welcome respite, a breathing space, a trip abroad, and then one returns to work. If hapticality, the touch of the undercommons, is “a visceral register of experience … the feel that what is to come is here” (Bradley 2014, 129–130), then this seems elusive. It is hard to detect a sense of the utopic undercommons rising to the surface of the corporate-imperial university. Moten describes the call to disorder and to study as a way to “excavate new aesthetic, political, and economic dispositions” (Moten 2008, 1745). But this notion of excavating is highly problematic. It is common within the discourse of “everyday utopianism”—finding utopia in the everyday, recovering lost or repressed transcendence in “everydayness” (Gardiner 2006)—to describe the process of utopian recovery in terms of excavating: excavating repressed desires, submerged longings, suppressed histories, untapped possibilities. But the fundamental questions of where to dig and how to identify a utopian “find” are never adequately addressed (see Webb 2017). Gardiner defines utopia as “a series of forces, tendencies and possibilities that are immanent in the here and now, in the pragmatic activities of everyday life” (2006, 2). But how are these forces, tendencies and possibilities to be identified and recovered? For Harney and Moten, it is through study, hapticality and militant arrhythmia. These are slippy concepts, however, evading concrete material referents. What is it to inhabit the undercommons? Those who have written of their experiences refer to “small acts of marronage” such as poaching resources and redeploying them in ways at odds with the university’s designs and demands (Reddy 2016, 7), or exploiting funding streams “to form cracks in the institution that enable the Others to invade the university” (Smith, Dyke, and Hermes 2013, 150). For Adusei-Poku (2015), the undercommons is a space of refuge which is all about survival (2015, 4–5). We who feel homeless in the university are forced into refuge. We gather together to survive. We may gain satisfaction from small acts of marronage, but this is less about bringing the utopic common underground to the surface as it is a form of “radical escapism” (Adusei-Poku 2015, 4). Benveniste (2015, v) tells us that: “The undercommons has no set location and no return address. There is no map for entering and no guide for staying. The only condition is a living appetite. Listen to its hunger for difference.” We need more than poetry, however. And we need more than a series of minor acts of resistance. As Srnicek and Williams rightly emphasize, resistance is a defensive, reactive gesture, resisting against. Resistance is not a utopian endeavour: “We do not resist a new world into being” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 47). The undercommons, when one can find it, is a bolt hole, a place of refuge, a breathing space in the system. We need something more. The occupation Can the occupied building operate as a site of utopian possibility within the corporate-imperial university? Reflections on, and theorizations of, two recent waves of occupation—“Occupied California” 2009–2010 and the UK Occupations 2010–2011—have answered this question affirmatively. The “occupation” should not be understood here as solely or necessarily “student occupation.” It goes without saying—though sadly so often does need saying —that “faculty also have a responsibility to fight with and for students” (Smeltzer and Hearn 2015, 356). Though led by a new historical subject, “the graduate without a future” (Schwarz-WeinStein 2015, 11), the importance of faculty support for the occupations was emphasized on both sides of the Atlantic (Research and Destroy 2010, 11; Dawson 2011, 112; Holmes and R&D and Dead Labour 2011, 14; Ismail 2011, 128; Newfield and EduFactory 2011, 26). Long before Occupy took shape in Zuccotti Park, “occupation” was being heralded as the harbinger of a new society and a new way of being. If we return to the notion of creating utopian spaces, the key aim for some of the occupiers was to create communes within the university walls—to communize space (Inoperative Committee 2011, 6).8 Communization here is understood as a form of insurrectionary anarchism that refuses to talk of a transition to communism, insisting instead upon the immediate formation of zones of activity removed from exchange, money, compulsory labor, and the impersonal domination of the commodity form (Anon 2010a, 5). As one pamphlet declared: We will take whatever measures are necessary both to destroy this world as quickly as possible and to create, here and now, the world we want: a world without wages, without bosses, without borders, without states. (Anon 2010d, 34) This is a revolutionary anarchism that takes the university campus as the site for a practice—communization—that not only prefigures but also realizes the vision of a free society. Heavily influenced by The Coming Insurrection (Invisible Committee 2009), but tapping into a long tradition of anarchist theory and practice from Hakim Bey’s Temporary Autonomous Zones (Bey 1985) to David Graeber’s Direct Action (Graeber 2009), occupation becomes “the creation of a momentary opening in capitalist time and space, a rearrangement that sketches the contours of a new society” (Research and Destroy 2010, 11). It is “an attempt to imagine a new kind of everyday life” (Hatherley 2011, 123). Firth (2012) refers to these momentary openings as critical, experimental utopias: Such utopias are … simultaneously immanent and prefigurative. They are immanent insofar as they allow space for the immediate expression of desires, satisfaction of needs and also the articulation of difference or dissent. They are prefigurative to the extent that they allow one to practice and exemplify what one would like to see at a more proliferative range in the future (26) The ultimate aim is for the practice to spread beyond the campus through a dual process of provocative rupture—the idea that insurrectionary moments can unleash the collective imagination and stimulate an outpouring of creativity that blows apart common sense and offers glimpses of a future world (Gibson-Graham 2006, 51; Shukaitis and Graeber 2007, 37)—and “contaminationism,” that is, spreading by means of example (Graeber 2009, 211). It may well have been the case that communism was realized on the campuses of Berkeley and UCL, that a momentary opening in capitalist space/time appeared through which another world could be glimpsed. The occupation, however—whether California, London, or anywhere else—is likely always to remain a localized temporary disruptive practice. A practice with utopian potency, for sure, in terms of suspending normalized forms of discipline and opening new egalitarian discursive spaces (Rheingans and Hollands 2013; Nişancioğlu and Pal 2016). In terms of wider systemic change, however, “small interventions consisting of relatively non-scalable actions are highly unlikely to ever be able to reorganise our socioeconomic system” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 29). What “the occupation” demonstrates more than anything is the reality of the corporate-imperial university, as the institutional hierarchy, backed by the carceral power of the police and criminal justice system, inevitably disperses the occupiers—often using militarized force—and repossesses the occupied space in a strong assertion of its ownership rights not only to university buildings but also to what constitutes legitimate thought and behavior within them (on this see Docherty 2015, 90). The significance, and utopian potential, one attaches to campus occupations depends in part upon the significance one attaches to the university as a site of struggle. For the Edu-Factory Collective: As was the factory, so now is the university. Where once the factory was a paradigmatic site of struggle between workers and capitalists, so now the university is a key space of conflict, where the ownership of knowledge, the reproduction of the labour force, and the creation of social and cultural stratifications are all at stake. This is to say the university is not just another institution subject to sovereign and governmental controls, but a crucial site in which wider social struggles are won and lost. (Caffentzis and Federici 2011, 26) Clearly, if this is true, then the form the struggle takes, and the example it sets, is of immense significance. Srnicek and Williams describe as “wishful thinking” the idea that the occupation might spread beyond the campus by means of rupture or contamination (2016, 35). However, if the university really is a key site of class struggle (Seybold 2008, 120; Haiven and Khasnabish 2014, 38), a site through which wider struggles are refracted and won or lost, then the transformative potential of the occupation needs to be attended to seriously. The analysis of the university offered by the Edu-Factory Collective is, however, outdated. Sounding like Daniel Bell writing in 1973 about how universities had become the “axial structures” of post-industrial society (Bell 1973, 12), the analysis does not hold water today. Moten overdoes it when he tells us that “the university is a kind of corpse. It is dead. It’s a dead institutional body” (Moten 2015, 78). What is clear, however, is that “focusing on the university as a site of radical transformation is a mistake” (Holmes and R&D and Dead Labour 2011, 13). As has been widely noted, there is very little distinguishing universities from other for-profit corporations (Readings 1996; Lustig 2005; Washburn 2005; Shear 2008, Tuchman 2009). What does separate them is their inefficiency, due in large part to the fact that universities operate also as medieval guilds, with faculties “ruled by masters who lord over journeymen and apprentices in an artisanal system of production” (Jemielniak and Greenwood 2015, 77). If the university is a sinister hybrid monstrosity—part medieval guild, part criminal corporation—which has no role other than reproducing its own privilege, then no special status can be attributed to campus protests. In this case, “A free university in the midst of a capitalist society is like a reading room in a prison” (Research and Destroy 2010, 10). A reading room in a prison. Another apposite metaphor. The occupation is a safe space, offering temporary respite, a place to hide, a refuge, a bolt-hole, a breathing space. As with the utopian classroom and the undercommons, what the occupation suggests is that “defending small bunkers of autonomy against the onslaught of capitalism is the best that can be hoped for” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 48). Conclusion Zaslove was right to characterize utopian pedagogy within the corporateimperial university as the search for bolt-holes and breathing spaces in the system. He himself suggests that, “All university classes should become dialogic-experiential models that educate by expanding the zones of contact with wider communities” (2007, 102). Like so many others, Zaslove sees dialogic-experiential models of education beginning in the classroom then expanding outward. The literature is full of references to “exceeding the limits of the university classroom” (Coté, Day, and de Peuter 2007a, 325), “extend [ing] beyond the boundaries of the campus” (Ruben 2000, 211), and “breeching the walls of the university compounds and spilling into the streets” (Research and Destroy 2010, 10). This all brings to mind Giroux’s notion of academics as border crossers (Giroux 1992), but it also paints a picture of academics taking as their starting point the university and from there crossing the border into the community and the street. The University can be the site for fleeting, transitory, small-scale experiences of utopian possibility—in the classroom, the undercommons, the occupation. It cannot be the site for transformative utopian politics. It cannot even be the starting point for this. Given the corporatization and militarization of the university, academics are increasingly becoming “functionaries of elite interests” inhabiting a culture which serves to reproduce these interests (Shear 2008, 56). Within the university, “radical” initiatives or movements will soon be co-opted, recuperated, commodified, and neutralized (Gibson-Graham 2006, xxvi; Seybold 2008, 123; Neary 2012b, 249; Rolfe 2013, 21). Institutional habitus weights so heavily that projects born in the university will be scarred from the outset by a certain colonizing “imaginary of education” (Burdick and Sandlin 2010, 117). And we have long known that the university is but one space of learning, and perhaps not a very important one at that. Identifying the academy as the starting point for a utopian pedagogy privileges this arcane space over sites of public pedagogy such as film, television, literature, sport, advertising, architecture, media in its various forms, political organizations, religious institutions, and the workplace (Todd 1997). Perhaps the emphasis on creating radical experimental spaces within the academy needs to shift toward operating in existing spaces of resistance outside it. Haiven and Khasnabish argue that many social movements function already as “social laboratories for the generation of alternative relationships, subjectivities, institutions and practices” (2014, 62), providing “a space for experiments in knowledge production, radical imagination, subjectification, and concrete alternative-building” (Khasnabish 2012, 237). Why locate utopian pedagogy in the university when “critical utopian politics” can take place in “infrastructures of resistance” such as intentional communities, housing collectives, squats, art centers, community theatres, bars, book shops, health collectives, social centers, independent media and, increasingly of course, the digital sphere (Firth 2012; Shantz 2012; Amsler 2015; Dallyn, Marinetto, and Cederstrom 2015)? Moving beyond short-term, localized, temporary modes of resistance, utopian pedagogy would work across these sites to develop a long-term strategy and vision. There is a role for the academic in utopian politics, but not in the university-as-such. The utopian pedagogue has a responsibility to exploit their own privilege and to work with students, communities and movements outside and divorced from the university. As Shear rightly notes, academics (and especially those working in the humanities and social sciences) “inhabit a privileged space in which critical inquiry concerning social hegemony and political-economic domination” is possible (Shear 2008, 56). Within the university, however, spaces for embodying and enacting this kind of inquiry have become constrained, compromised, monitored, surveilled, co-opted, and recuperated. As I have argued throughout this article, utopian pedagogy has become a search for bolt-holes and breathing spaces in the system. Beyond the academy, however, there is a role to play. As Chomsky (2010) tells us, with privilege comes responsibility. And as Giroux frames it, this is an ethical and political responsibility to provide “theoretical resources and modes of analysis” to help forge “a utopian imaginary” (Giroux 2014a; 153; 2014b, 200). This means putting one’s knowledge and resources to use in the service of a collaborative process of memory- and story-making, pulling together disparate inchoate dreams and yearnings in order to generate a utopian vision that can help inform, guide, and mobilize long-term collective action for systemic change.

# 2NC

## T

### 2NC---AT: Distancing

#### They don’t solve any of this---proposing ways to alter debate from within the confines of a round not only fails, but backfires

**Atchison and Panetta 9** – \*Director of Debate at Trinity University and \*\*Director of Debate at the University of Georgia (Jarrod, and Edward, “Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future,” The Sage Handbook of Rhetorical Studies, Lunsford, Andrea, ed., 2009, p. 317-334)

The final problem with an individual debate round focus is the role of competition. Creating community change through individual debate rounds sacrifices the “community” portion of the change. Many teams that promote activist strategies in debates profess that they are more interested in creating change than winning debates. What is clear, however, is that the vast majority of teams that are not promoting community change are very interested in winning debates. The tension that is generated from the clash of these opposing forces is tremendous. Unfortunately, this is rarely a productive tension. Forcing teams to consider their purpose in debating, their style in debates, and their approach to evidence are all critical aspects of being participants in the community. However, the dismissal of the proposed resolution that the debaters have spent countless hours preparing for, in the name of a community problem that the debaters often have little control over, does little to engender coalitions of the willing. Should a debate team lose because their director or coach has been ineffective at recruiting minority participants? Should a debate team lose because their coach or director holds political positions that are in opposition to the activist program? Competition has been a critical component of the interest in intercollegiate debate from the beginning, and it does not help further the goals of the debate community to dismiss competition in the name of community change. The larger problem with locating the “debate as activism” perspective within the competitive framework is that it overlooks the communal nature of the community problem. If each individual debate is a decision about how the debate community should approach a problem, then the losing debaters become collateral damage in the activist strategy dedicated toward creating community change. One frustrating example of this type of argument might include a judge voting for an activist team in an effort to help them reach elimination rounds to generate a community discussion about the problem. Under this scenario, the losing team serves as a sacrificial lamb on the altar of community change. Downplaying the important role of competition and treating opponents as scapegoats for the failures of the community may increase the profile of the winning team and the community problem, but it does little to generate the critical coalitions necessary to address the community problem, because the competitive focus encourages teams to concentrate on how to beat the strategy with little regard for addressing the community problem. There is no role for competition when a judge decides that it is important to accentuate the publicity of a community problem. An extreme example might include a team arguing that their opponents’ academic institution had a legacy of civil rights abuses and that the judge should not vote for them because that would be a community endorsement of a problematic institution. This scenario is a bit more outlandish but not unreasonable if one assumes that each debate should be about what is best for promoting solutions to diversity problems in the debate community. If the debate community is serious about generating community change, then it is more likely to occur outside a traditional competitive debate. When a team loses a debate because the judge decides that it is better for the community for the other team to win, then they have sacrificed two potential advocates for change within the community. Creating change through wins generates backlash through losses. Some proponents are comfortable with generating backlash and argue that the reaction is evidence that the issue is being discussed. From our perspective, the discussion that results from these hostile situations is not a productive one where participants seek to work together for a common goal. Instead of giving up on hope for change and agitating for wins regardless of who is left behind, it seems more reasonable that the debate community should try the method of public argument that we teach in an effort to generate a discussion of necessary community changes. Simply put, debate competitions do not represent the best environment for community change because it is a competition for a win and only one team can win any given debate, whereas addressing systemic century-long community problems requires a tremendous effort by a great number of people.

#### Specifically true for their aff---they can’t resolve any of their examples---ie: calling the cops on black ppl---the vast majority of community members already agree that’s bad, but the controversy isn’t the problem, it’s the solution

#### They also don’t have a ballot key warrant---intrinsic motivation is far more likely to spark change

### 2NC---AT: Powers

#### They are correct some debaters will inevitably be evil, but that’s not a reason to give up on its positive potential---absent debate, institutionally sophistry is inevitable, so its try or die neg, AND the alternative to switch side results in a far worse version of what they’re critiquing

**Stannard** 20**06** – Director of Forensics and Associate Lecturer in the Department of Communication and Journalism at the University of Wyoming (4/18, Matt, The Underview, Spring 2006 Faculty Senate Speaker Series Speech, “Deliberation, Debate, and Democracy in the Academy and Beyond”, http://theunderview.blogspot.com/2006/04/deliberation-democracy-and-debate.html, 3NR)

If it is indeed true that debate inevitably produces other-oriented deliberative discourse at the expense of students' confidence in their first-order convictions, this would indeed be a trade-off worth criticizing. In all fairness, Hicks and Greene do not overclaim their critique, and they take care to acknowledge the important ethical and cognitive virtues of deliberative debating. When represented as anything other than a political-ethical concern, however, Hicks and Greene's critique has several problems: First, as my colleague J.P. Lacy recently pointed out, it seems a tremendous causal (or even rhetorical) stretch to go from "debating both sides of an issue creates civic responsibility essential to liberal democracy" to "this civic responsibility upholds the worst forms of American exceptionalism." Second, Hicks and Greene do not make any comparison of the potentially bad power of debate to any alternative. Their implied alternative, however, is a form of forensic speech that privileges personal conviction. The idea that students should be able to preserve their personal convictions at all costs seems far more immediately tyrannical, far more immediately damaging to either liberal or participatory democracy, than the ritualized requirements that students occasionally take the opposite side of what they believe. Third, as I have suggested and will continue to suggest, while a debate project requiring participants to understand and often "speak for" opposing points of view may carry a great deal of liberal baggage, it is at its core a project more ethically deliberative than institutionally liberal. Where Hicks and Greene see debate producing "the liberal citizen-subject," I see debate at least having the potential to produce "the deliberative human being." The fact that some academic debaters are recruited by the CSIS and the CIA does not undermine this thesis. Absent healthy debate programs, these think-tanks and government agencies would still recruit what they saw as the best and brightest students. And absent a debate community that rewards anti-institutional political rhetoric as much as liberal rhetoric, those students would have little-to-no chance of being exposed to truly oppositional ideas. Moreover, if we allow ourselves to believe that it is "culturally imperialist" to help other peoples build institutions of debate and deliberation, we not only ignore living political struggles that occur in every culture, but we fall victim to a dangerous ethnocentrism in holding that "they do not value deliberation like we do." If the argument is that our participation in fostering debate communities abroad greases the wheels of globalization, the correct response, in debate terminology, is that such globalization is non-unique, inevitable, and there is only a risk that collaborating across cultures in public debate and deliberation will foster resistance to domination—just as debate accomplishes wherever it goes. Indeed, Andy Wallace, in a recent article, suggests that Islamic fundamentalism is a byproduct of the colonization of the lifeworld of the Middle East; if this is true, then one solution would be to foster cross-cultural deliberation among people on both sides of the cultural divide willing to question their own preconceptions of the social good. Hicks and Greene might be correct insofar as elites in various cultures can either forbid or reappropriate deliberation, but for those outside of that institutional power, democratic discussion would have a positively subversive effect.

We can read such criticisms in two ways. The first way is as a warning: That we ought to remain cautious of how academic debate will be represented and deployed outside of the academy, in the ruthless political realm, by those who use it to dodge truthful assertions, by underrepresented groups, of instances of material injustice. In this sense, the fear is one of a “legalistic” evasion of substantive injustice by those privileging procedure over substance, a trained style over the primordial truth of marginalized groups.

I prefer that interpretation to the second one: That the switch-side, research-driven “game” of debate is politically bankrupt and should give way to several simultaneous zones of speech activism, where speakers can and should only fight for their own beliefs. As Gordon Mitchell has pointed out, such balkanized speech will break down into several enclaves of speaking, each with its own political criteria for entry. In such a collection of impassable and unpermeable communities, those power relations, those material power entities, that evade political speech will remain unaccountable, will be given a “free pass” by the speech community, who will be so wrapped up in their own micropolitics, or so busy preaching to themselves and their choirs, that they will never understand or confront the rhetorical tropes used to mobilize both resources and true believers in the service of continued material domination. Habermas’s defense of the unfinished Enlightenment is my defense of academic debate: Don’t throw the baby out with the bathwater. Instead, seek to expand this method of deliberation to those who will use it to liberate themselves, confront power, and create ethical, nonviolent patterns of problem resolution. If capitalism corrupts debate, well, then I say we save debate.

#### Even in their cutting, she’s making a limited criticism of British debate curriculum---ie: how people are “trained to argue anything so long as it preserves the existing order “ but that isnt policy debate---Stannard answers it and they need to win we bracket out criticism

#### Their article also got taken down because their author was spreading transphobic hate speech---reject her scholarship

**Hostis Journal 16** ZINE: “It’s Not a Debate, It’s War!” Posted on April 8, 2016 by hostisjournal. Accessed February 1st 2020. <https://incivility.org/2016/04/08/zine-its-not-a-debate-its-war/> || OES-SW

On Hostis’s removal of Nina Power’s ‘zine ‘It’s Not a Debate, It’s a War’:

We are removing this pamphlet as an act of solidarity with transfeminism. Hostis has always defined politics as acts of partisanship in the ethical game of alliances. Our actions follow from the conviction that there is no room for debating reactionaries. There will always be intense heartache in the decision to introduce distance between people, concepts, and projects that once established friendships. But that is why these actions bear such an important title: politics.

#### This should put the bombastic rhetoric of policing and how institutions “dictate the boundaries of ‘reasonable’ discussion”---she’s an alt-right free speech hack complaining about censoring her hate speech towards transgender, black, muslim, and jewish people

**Stupart ND** Linda Stupart is an artist, writer, and educator from Cape Town, South Africa. They completed their PhD at Goldsmiths in 2016, with a project engaged in new considerations of objectification and abjection. “On trauma, paranoia, and fascism (and on Nina Power).” No Date Listed. <https://www.thewhitepube.co.uk/on-trauma> || OES-SW

Without Nina Power, I may never have broken into academia in the UK. She supported me emotionally, financially, and professionally, in ways that were sisterly and generous. These things – friendship, trauma, and love – make it hard to divest of a person. Equally, for myself and many of my peers, there is an overwhelming feeling of having failed both Power, and ‘the movement’, now that it is clear that former feminist activist and comrade[1], Nina Power, is openly aligning herself with violent ‘edgelord’[2] alt-right men[3]; transphobes[4], and has definitively divested herself of contemporary feminist thought[5]. I do think it is important to clearly say that right now, Power should not be speaking as a feminist in public (since she has clearly said she has no allegiance to contemporary feminisms); and to interrogate the harm her ideas are doing in academic, social, and political circles, particularly to transgender people, but also all those most affected by the rise in alt-right sympathies, including people of colour, women, and the Muslim and Jewish communities. \*\*footnotes inserted below for the above paragraph: 1. Though Power is well known as a feminist, she also worked on anti-racist and anti-police violence campaigns, including anti-fascist protests, working with Defend the Right to Protest, and supporting families of people who have been murdered by the police. 2. Someone who attempts to seem edgy or cool by doing and saying intentionally harmful, socially unacceptable and ‘politically incorrect’ things, often online. 3. D.C. Miller is most well known in the UK for being the sole counter protestor at the demonstration to shut down LD-50 gallery, after it was discovered they were hosting confirmed alt-right commentator, Nick Land, and open ethno – nationalist Brett Stevens, among others. Miller, like many in the alt-right, ‘ironically’ flirts with fascism e.g. performing as esoteric fascist and artist, Julius Evola, in Athens. Miller has, on his public twitter account, also referred to [sic] ‘transsexual’ people as having a “psychotic” relation to the symbolic; defended Richard Spencer as having ‘done nothing wrong’, threatened the young women who run the White Pube (“time is running out for these textbook psychopaths”) and, as I discovered in writing this, had much to say about me, including: “Linda identifies as an iceberg, and her pronoun is ‘Ugh’”, “meet the new curator of the r\*\*\*\*d biennale”; and referred to me as “grotesque” etc. Power has recently also cheerfully appeared with Miller in Youtube videos hosted by Justin Murphey, most well known for being suspended from his academic post at Southampton University for comparing abortion rights to necrophilia, continuing that “"Y'know, you could actually justify necrophilia on grounds of queer politics or even more mainstream feminist politics” and responding to criticisms of ableism from students with, “And there is a difference between ableism and calling r\*\*\*\*ds r\*\*\*\*ds." 4. Power has herself compared gender dysphoria with eating disorders, and gender affirming medical interventions with self-harm. She has also uncritically attended ‘Woman’s Place’ meetings, a group dedicated to keeping transgender women out of women-only spaces, with a focus on support services for women who have faced violence. Furthermore, posting on her public Facebook account, Power came out in support of Helen Steel and Venice Allen around the time of the Gender Recognition Act consultation in 2018 when both Steel and Allen were focused on the transphobic bullying of then-teenager Lily Madigan, who had been voted into a Women’s Officer position in the Labour Party. In Power’s 2019 video with D.C Miller and Justin Murphey2, ‘Hate Speech, Feminism, & Paganism’, Murphey introduces Nina Power by saying she has “gotten into trouble recently” due to a “deviation on some relatively uncontroversial fact of reality”, which Murphey then clarifies as being “around trans issues”. Nina smiles, and does not contest this. 5. In her 2019 video with D.C Miller and Justin Murphey, ‘Hate Speech, Feminism, & Paganism’, Power states, “I do not have an allegiance to any of what is called Feminism today”

## Case

### 2NC---AT: Solvency

#### Their debt-based method doesn’t solve anything

Heaney, 17—Lecturer in Liberal Arts & Politics, King’s College London (Conor, “Stupidity and Study in the Contemporary University,” La Deleuziana, No. 5, 2017, dml)

With these notions briefly defined, Harney and Moten’s notion of study will be much clearer. For study occurs in a state of permanent debt, through the mutual elaboration of debt, in the undercommons. Harney and Moten’s concept of study pertains to those practices of thought which are not subsumed within logics of individualisation and competition – study is not “knowledge production” in the sense promoted by the contemporary university – and takes place where the undercommons «meet to elaborate their debt without credit» (2013: 68). Study, as such, occurs outside of regimes of credit, in which debt is always calculable and payable (that is, within calculative regimes of stupidity); it is also an amateur practice, unprofessional. In or though study, the undercommons do not acquire credit, graduate, articulate interests, nor do they construct policies (indeed, professionalisation and policy are attempts to capture the capacity to study that the undercommons have). So what do they do, those «committed to black study in the university’s undercommon rooms?» (2013: 67).

They study without an end, plan without a pause, rebel without a policy, conserve without a patrimony. They study in the university and the university forces them under, relegates them to the state of those without interests, without credit, without debt that bears interest, that earns credits. They never graduate. They just ain’t ready. They’re building something down there. Mutual debt, debt unpayable, debt unbounded, debt unconsolidated, debt to each other in study group, to others in a nurse’s room, to others in a barber shop, to others in a squat, a dump, a woods, a bed, an embrace. (2013: 67-68)

What informal space is not a site of study? A site of planning? Study surrounds us. Despite regimes of credit, despite policies to capture the undercommons into accreditation and professionalism, which is to say despite the professionals’ attempt to locate and make policy to address the undercommons. Policy as instruction from above; policy as correction (curriculum as policy; curriculum as professionalisation (Hall and Smyth 2016; Heleta 2016)). Planning, launched from anywhere («any kitchen, any back porch, any basement, any hall, any park bench, improvised party» (2013: 74)), is a continuous experiment with the informal, it is «the ceaseless experiment with the futurial presence of the forms of life that make such activities possible» (2013: 75). Study as futurial and experimental being-with-others. As such, the university is, no doubt, a place of study, but study is by no means of the university; indeed, try as it might (through governance, through policy, through curriculum), the university cannot fully exclude study (2013: 113). Will study be possible in the university-to-come, under the governance of our contemporary systemic stupidity?

In study - where debt is permanent, inexpiable, and always being elaborated – one can lose track. This, in fact, is necessary for study’s open-endedness. When we enter study, we forget our debts, and «begin to see that the whole point is to lose track of them and just build them in a way that allows for everyone to feel that she or he can contribute or not contribute to being in a space» (2013: 109). An ongoing experiment with the informal, “with and for” each other in their projects of study. No longer simply “in but not of” the university, but also “within and for” the undercommons of the university. Not that this movement is without its difficulties:

When you move further out into an autonomous setting, where you get some free space and free time a little more easily, then, what you have to attend to is the shift, for me, between the within and against – which when you’re deep in the institution you spend a lot of time on it – and the with and for. And that changes a lot of shit. All those things are always in play. When I say “with and for,” I mean studying with people rather than teaching them, and when I say “for,” I mean studying with people in service of a project, which in this case I think we could just say is more study. (2013: 147-148, my emphases)

How to be “with and for” is thereby itself a project of study. The undercommons are still working out what it means to be with and what it means to be for. It is through this point that we can describe why Harney and Moten will often use the term prophetic organisation when discussing the activities of the undercommons. That the undercommons participates in prophecy is another aspect of their lack of professionalism and naïvety. Their planning is of a prophetic type; of, as I have already noted, an experimental and futurial type. Administration, policy, and governance has no time for planning, for prophecy, for futural projection; it foresees risks, governs, and controls, such is its stupidity. It demands knowable objects: the state, economy, civil society, populations, border flows and security risks. Such are the proper objects of academic research, governance, and integration into the flows of stupidity. In study, there are no objects to be known, but rather experiments to conduct. Or, to put this slightly differently, the “object” of study is refigured as «future project» (2013: 27); study involves an investment or commitment to the future. This is not at all to say that there undercommons have no objects of study, that they do not focus on this or that problem, project, or experiment. In study, the undercommons organise around problems, around projects of study. However, through this (prophetic) process, they do not articulate a position, enunciate interests, or clamour for representation. They just keep on studying, planning, project-ing, creating, problematising. Too open, too playful (2013: 131), the undercommons are always exceeding any declaration of interest or representation, always slipping away from correctional institutions (the university, the prison):

Politics proposes to make us better, but we were good already in the mutual debt that can never be made good. We owe it to each other to falsify the institution, to make politics incorrect « ... » We owe each other the indeterminate. We owe each other everything « ... » We are the general antagonism to politics looming outside every attempt to politicise, every imposition of self-governance, every sovereign decision and its degraded miniature, every emergent state and home sweet home. We are disruption and consent to disruption. We preserve upheaval. Sent to fulfill by abolishing, to renew by unsettling « ... » we got politics surrounded. We cannot represent ourselves. We can’t be represented. (2013: 20)

### 2NC---AT: Psychological Drives

#### There is no singular root cause of psychological drives---their theory is overly reductionist

Hook, 21—Associate Professor of Psychology at Duquesne University (Derek, “Pilfered pleasure: on racism as “the theft of enjoyment”,” *Lacan and Race: Racism, Identity, and Psychoanalytic Theory*, Chapter 2, pg 36-39, dml)

What is immediately striking in these extracts is the role played by affect, or more accurately yet, by the “pained stimulation” of the aroused passions of enjoyment. What both authors highlight—and this speaks to the analytical value of the concept—is that forms of excess stimulation (the “negative pleasure” of jouissance) underlie and propel Symbolic and political constructions of otherness. Different cultural modes of enjoyment are, furthermore, fundamentally discordant. We have then not so much a “Clash of Civilizations”—to reference the Samuel Huntington’s (1997) much cited thesis—as a clash of enjoyments.

Moreover, the difficulty that we have in realizing “full” enjoyment—something that is impossible in Lacanian theory for “castrated” speaking beings—is dealt with by imagining the supposedly unimpaired and inevitably disturbing enjoyment possessed by cultural/racial/sexual others. In short, the fact that we cannot attain the jouissance we feel we deserve results in perceptions of an unhindered, illegitimate, and undeserved enjoyment on the part of others. As Sheldon George notes: “the other’s jouissance, or enjoyment, [is] … the very core around which … otherness articulates itself” (2016: 3). Political jealousy, as Žižek calls it, is thus (at least in part) the result of incompatibilities and more importantly yet, perceived sacrifices of jouissance.

Jouissance: unserviceable tool of political analysis?

Despite having offered only a brief introduction to the above Lacanian ideas, we should pause here for a moment to voice a number of prospective methodological and conceptual problems implied by the racism as (theft of) enjoyment thesis. Doing so will help us focus the expository comments to follow, and indeed, to highlight the potential analytical advantages the thesis may have to offer.

The first critique, which applies to a wide historical range of psychoanalytic theories of racism (see Cohen, 2002; Frosh 1989; Stavrakis 1999), is that of psychological reductionism. Simply put: the complexity of the various historical, discursive, and socioeconomic causes of racism are invariably deprioritized and accorded a peripheral explanatory role once the domain of the psychological is privileged. Accounts of the psychological factors underlying various instances of racism are thus not only de-historicizing and hopelessly generalizing; they are also invariably depoliticizing.

A second critique: is jouissance not a hopelessly open-ended concept? Virtually any cultural behaviour, bodily intensity or libidinal activity can, it seems, be considered to be an instance of jouissance. In view of racism, for example, the other’s enjoyment can refer to everything from their incomprehensible cultural customs and/or religious beliefs (epitomized, for example, in odd food and dress restrictions), to perceived aspects of their distinctive physicality/sensuality (their food, the way they dance, the sound of their music), to attributions of superabundant vitality (they are excessively promiscuous, religious, lazy, etc.)? The concept of jouissance seems thus to be both underdifferentiated and overly inclusive, applying to a potentially endless array of behaviors and experiences. Without a clearer sense of how to differentiate what qualifies as enjoyment and what does not, the concept loses analytical value.

A third line of critique: different modes of enjoyment are implied within the literature, without being properly distinguished. In Žižek’s descriptions of racism and jouissance, for example, jouissance is used broadly to refer to: visceral or passionate modes of experience (the “thrill of hate”); an array of enviable possessions (our “libidinal treasures”) perceived as under threat by cultural others; and a type of noxious “surplus vitality” possessed by such others. So, whose enjoyment are we most fundamentally concerned with in these notions of racism as jouissance, the other’s, or our own? What is the relationship between these two types of jouissance? And how are they related to a third mode, namely the “negative pleasure” of making—experiencing—such troubling attributions in the first place?

Fourth, there is ever-present problem of de-contextualization in “shorthand” applications of the term. This leads to a situation in which enjoyment itself is treated as a causative force beyond adequate consideration of a series of accompanying concepts (the frame of fantasy, the operation of the signifier, the role of the law, the “object a” as cause of desire) that necessarily accompany its proper psychoanalytic application. What auxiliary terms must thus be utilized alongside the concept if it is to serve us as a viable analytical tool?

Critique 1: the notion of enjoyment as psychologically reductionist

There is a crucial passage that is repeated in a number of Žižek’s earlier books (1992, 1993, 2005) and that serves as perhaps his most direct exposition of racism as the theft of enjoyment:

What is at stake in ethnic tensions is always [a kind of ] possession: the “other” wants to steal our enjoyment (by ruining our “way of life”) and/ or he has access to some secret, perverse enjoyment. In short, what gets on our nerves, what really bothers us about the “other” is the peculiar way he organizes his enjoyment (the smell of his food, his “noisy” songs and dances, his strange manners, his attitudes to work—in the racist perspective, the “other” is either a workaholic stealing our jobs or an idler living on our labour)” (1992: 165).

While this seems, in many ways, a gripping account, from a sociologist or historian’s perspective, the degree of reductionism is staggering. The multiple complex sociological, economic, and socio-historical variables underlying distinctive historical forms of racism are brushed aside in favor of a generalizing psychoanalytic formula. Racism = reaction to perception that the (perversely enjoying) other has stolen our enjoyment. This reduction of racism to an affective equation is evident also in Žižek’s precursor in this conceptual domain, Jacques-Alain Miller:

Why does the Other remain Other? What is the cause for our hatred of him, for our hatred of him in his very being? It is hatred of the enjoyment in the Other. This would be the most general formula for the modern racism we are witnessing today: a hatred of a particular way the Other enjoys … The question of tolerance or intolerance is … located on the level of tolerance or intolerance toward the enjoyment of the Other, the Other who essentially steals my own enjoyment (Miller, cited in Žižek 1993: 203).

The depoliticization (indeed, the implicit psychologization) inherent in such a conceptual move is surprising inasmuch it is something that Žižek has proved critical of elsewhere. In a 1998 text, for example, Žižek outlines the charge of psychological reductionism against standard psychoanalytic explanations of racism, which offer

a way of explaining racism that ignore … not only racism’s socioeconomic conditions but the sociosymbolic context of cultural values and identifications that generate reactions to the experience of ethnic otherness (1988: 154).

Surely this also applies to the racism as theft of enjoyment formula outlined above? Explanations of racism as jouissance are surely prone to psychological reductionism inasmuch as they often appear to privilege a series of psychoanalytic assumptions (drive, fantasy, libido, projection, etc.) as existing prior to—or independently of—considerations of economic, historical, political, and socio-symbolic context?

#### Afropessimism is theoretically and empirically incorrect

Birge 19 (Charles, MA in Comparative Studies, “The Addiction of Transparency: Observations on the Emotional Neurophysiology of Whiteness.” Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Master of Arts in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University. <https://etd.ohiolink.edu/!etd.send_file?accession=osu1554891264402108&disposition=inline> //shree)

This deeper structure of race is more fully elucidated by the theoretical perspective of Afro-Pessimism, which has also greatly influenced my thinking on whiteness. Afro-Pessimism arose out of the innovations of black scholars Orlando Patterson (1982), Hortense Spillers (1987), and Saidiya Hartman (1997), and has been elaborated by Frank Wilderson (2010), Jared Sexton (2008), Christina Sharpe (2010, 2016), and Fred Moten (2003), among many others. While “Afro-Pessimism” is not a monolithic term, and not all of these scholars identify with it, all of them explore similar territory: they theorize blackness--both past and present--as a condition of absolute (or nearly absolute) captivity in which the expectations, norms, and laws of human relationality (e.g., gender, kinship, personhood) do not apply--the black slave is, again, “socially dead.” This means that blackness is beyond the purview of Human ethical institutions such as the state, the law, civil society, and politics writ large (even revolutionary politics). Moreover, this condition of social death is the ground against which the modern notion of Humanity indexes itself; that is, in the modern world, Humanity only knows itself in all of its capacities (the ability to reason, to have emotions, to enter into intimate and civil relationships) against the absolute incapacity of black slaves. Thus, AfroPessimism argues that black enslavement is not merely a tool of economic exploitation; it serves as a symbolic position against which the existential and psychological security of Humanity is obtained--a condition which persists in the present day. In psychoanalytic terms, then, it functions unconsciously to sustain the psychic health of the Human. While the positions of Human Mastery can be occupied by various non-black peoples depending on the needs of the structure, it is most closely correlated with whiteness. So, for AfroPessimism whiteness is not merely a social construction that secures the hegemony; whiteness is an existential structure, instantiated in the unconscious, the very nature of which is to parasitically prevent racial others--blackness in particular--from accessing the agency needed to participate in the struggle for hegemony. The Afro-Pessimist analysis resonated with me. Given how easily white supremacy seems to resist conscious denunciation, it seemed sensible to argue that the nature of whiteness was to parasitically suck dry the agency of people of color, blackness in particular. However, Afro-Pessimism also has a problem: it is, by definition, abstract and essentialist, leading to difficulties and confusion when discussing how it functions phenomenologically in everyday life. Challenging questions abound: if blackness is theorized as so totalizing that formations such as gender and class lose their significance, can it provide an alibi for black patriarchy and class elitism? And if whiteness is so totalizing, does it mean that white people can simply dismiss the possibility of political engagement and responsibility as out of their control? How would one theorize the diverging interests of a wealthy black man and a poor indigenous woman--is she still privileged in her contingent Humanity over his absolute enslavement? In a quasitheological fashion, Afro-Pessimism risks outsourcing the demands, nuances, and agency of everyday life to an abstraction that seems transcendent. Some Afro-Pessimist scholars attempt to address this problem. Sexton (“Peopleof-Color Blindness, 35-36), for example, analyzes ontology politically, rather than philosophically or theologically; he argues that the ontology of race is not actually a transcendent principle, but it is so deeply entrenched that it takes on the appearance of one. Wilderson (following Sexton) theorizes that race functions as a “libidinal economy” of unconscious psychic identification (with the mastery/capacity of whiteness) and abjection (of enslaved blackness) that structures “the whole of psychic life.” (Wilderson, 9) But both of these political and libidinal explanations still rely heavily on a near transcendent structural analysis, theorized as absolutely unconscious and always already present; they do not suggest how they might be accessed by conscious awareness, and there is no specific moment or condition in which they begin, other than the Middle Passage. But didn’t the Middle Passage arise out of certain conditions? And couldn’t undoing those conditions also undo the existential structure of whiteness? And what about the unconscious--is it really impossible to access? Sexton and Wilderson do not offer much practical guidance here, other than their unwavering commitment to stare down the structural antagonism of race.1

# 1NR

## K

### 1NR---AT: Energy

#### The point is just that the requirement to build energy as a prerequisite to *macro-political change* is the link---prefer a content-focus that generates energy as a byproduct through technocratic organizing

**Reed 12/23** [Adolph Reed Jr., professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, “Which Side Are You On?,” December 23, 2018, <https://www.commondreams.org/views/2018/12/23/which-side-are-you>]

Naschek's observation regarding contemporary left public intellectuals’ elevation of the will to pursue political change over the capacity to do so is especially important in this regard. Haider and others who tout the Combahee River Collective as a model for our time do so because its members were black lesbians who espoused a generic commitment to "liberation," not because of their approach to or record of movement-building. In the race-reductionist, identitarian world, being displaces doing; what one supposedly is, that is, can mean more than what one does or advocates concretely. We saw enough of that during the 2018 mid-term elections when we were exhorted to celebrate candidacies of various nonwhite, female, gay or lesbian, and gender-nonconforming aspirants because of the identity categories they embodied rather than the programs they advanced. To be sure, some of them embraced left agendas; some decidedly did not, even though they may nonetheless have been better options than their Republican opponents. Tensions around that identitarian approach erupted in what apparently has become a notorious conflict within DSA regarding endorsement of Cat Brooks, a black, female candidate in the 2018 Oakland, Califorinia mayor's race. Salazar adduces that controversy in his brief against the organization's socialist left majority, whom their identitarian opponents accused of racial insensitivity for denying Brooks the chapter's endorsement. I don't intend to assess that particular debate; I don't have adequate local knowledge. I do know that those opposing endorsement were circumspect – see, for example, this dispatch on the East Bay DSA's website about the recency of Brooks's reversal of stance on the charter school issue, after several years of prominent association with the charter movement. Salazar invokes a person he describes as "Oakland's loudest anti-charter activist," who backed her candidacy and who characterized his relationship with the candidate as "complicated," to support a claim that, in effect, she and others hadn't understood charterization's destructive force because charters "were sold to residents as a way to give them agency over their own schools." Charterization, his informant said, "'was tied to the self empowerment theme that goes back to the Black Panthers.'" But that justification seems uncomfortably akin to "I didn't know where I was or what I was doing" or "I was young and needed the money." Whether or not Brooks's conversion is genuine, wouldn't the earlier error—particularly considering the depth and duration of her commitment to it—justify skepticism with regard to how she might respond to other shiny new neoliberal interventions? Recourse to the charge that those who opposed Brooks' endorsement were driven by bad racial motives, rather than principled political concerns, underscores the dangers of race-reductionist politics. (Salazar is in general too willing to retail DSA identitarians' charges of racial insensitivity. In concluding the essay he quotes a tweet from Shanti Singh, a San Francisco DSA identitarian, implying that Naschek and her Philadelphia chapter co-chair Scott Jenkins were insensitive to the need to counter "right-wing antisemitism" when they proposed not canceling a scheduled chapter meeting in order to attend a counter protest of a pathetic demonstration by two-dozen equally pathetic wannabe fascist Proud Boys. It's unlikely, however, that Naschek, who is Jewish, would need sensitivity training about the evils of antisemitism.) This politics is open to the worst forms of opportunism, and it promises to be a major front on which neoliberal Democrats will attack the left, directly and indirectly, and these lines of attack stand out in combining red-baiting and race-baiting into a new, ostensibly progressive form of invective. Hillary Clinton's infamous 2016 campaign swipe at Sanders that his call for breaking up big banks wouldn't end racism was only one harbinger of things to come. Indeed, we should recall that it was followed hard upon by even more blunt attacks from prominent members of the black political class. When the campaign turned to South Carolina, with its large bloc of black Democratic voters, the state's black Congressman James Clyburn joined Georgia Congressman and icon of the civil rights movement, John Lewis, and Louisiana Congressman Cedric Richmond in denouncing Sanders as "irresponsible" in calling for non-commodified public goods in education, healthcare and other areas. Lewis sneered: "It's the wrong message to send any group. There's not anything free in America. We all have to pay for something. Education is not free. Health care is not free. Food is not free. Water is not free. I think it's very misleading to say to the American people we're going to give you something free." As I pointed out in The Baffler, "Richmond's rebuke was especially telling in that he couched it in terms of his role as chair of the Congressional Black Caucus and the group's 'responsibility to make sure that young people know that' a social-democratic agenda is 'too good to be true.'" This points to precisely what is limited, and in the context of the current debate over ways forward for the broader left, dangerous about the simplistic race-reductionism that Salazar, Haider, and others advocate as a necessary accompaniment of, and in practical terms precursor, or even alternative to a pursuit of a socialist, or social-democratic political agenda. The juxtaposition they assert between "race" or identity and class is bogus. It presumes both the fiction that "(working) class" means "white" and that blacks or other nonwhites and the like are somehow outside the capitalist class dynamics that shape American life and, most important in this context, politics. As the ideological and programmatic commitments of Clyburn, Lewis, Richmond and others in the black political elite and chattering classes illustrate, that is hardly the case. Moreover, most black people, like other Americans, are concerned with finding or keeping decent jobs, housing, health care, education, etc.—the stuff of a social-democratic agenda. Hence Bernie Sanders's approval ratings remain higher among black Americans than any other group. Simply put, one either supports such an agenda, or one does not. For the first time in most of our lifetimes, we have an opportunity to make commitment to that sort of agenda the definitive fault-line in American politics for 2020 and beyond. There have been signs since before the 2016 election that both many Wall Street Democrats and nominally progressive identitarians would rather lose than embrace the social-democratic left. As we approached the 2018 mid-term elections and since, it has become ever clearer that a major struggle between now and 2020 will be over how we define the "progressive" electoral agenda, whether it should be weighted toward advancing candidates who are nonwhite, female, and gender-nonconforming or those who support such policy initiatives as Medicare For All. Of course, those goals are not necessarily in conflict. The question, though, is which should take priority when they are. We must be clear that they are not interchangeable. That is also a critical point to keep in mind, as we have been and increasingly will be confronted with "don't let the perfect be the enemy of the good" liberals, who want, in the name of electability or bringing the party together, or whatever else, to water down Medicare For All or other components of a social-democratic agenda before we've ever had a serious effort to organize a popular base in support of them. It has been and will be all too easy for the occasion to elect "the first" black/Native American/woman/lesbian to substitute for the need to advance an agenda that can appeal broadly to working people of all races, genders and sexual orientations. Our side's failure to struggle for that sort of agenda is one reason Trump is in the White House. We can't afford to repeat the mistakes that helped bring about that result. The question of the moment is, in the spirit of Florence Reece and her brother and sister coalminers in the 1931 Harlan County War, Which Side Are You On?